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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



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28 March 1986

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

MAJ GEN SHAPALIN: PREPARING FOR 27TH CONGRESS, FOREIGN THREAT

Moscow AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA in Russian No 19, Oct 85 pp 1-5

[Article by Maj Gen N. Shapalin, deputy chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Meeting the 27th CPSU Congress: To Homeland and Party--Our Military Labor!"]

[Text] All the Soviet people are actively preparing for the 27th Party Congress. Everywhere in the country great work is being conducted, intense labor is boiling and grandiose problems of communist creation are being solved. Toilers in city and village are sparing no effort to complete 1985 successfully and to make good preparations in anticipation of the new 12th Five-Year Plan. With concrete good work, energy and thrift, they are supporting the party's course which was heartily approved for the acceleration of the social and economic development of the country determined by the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Thousands of collectives have risen to the shock work duty in honor of our native party's 27th Congress and accept an increase in socialist obligations. Everywhere there is support for the AvtoVAZ initiative, the essence of which was the maximum use of all available resources to achieve the highest production indicators, to produce products of the highest quality and to take complete steps to create and introduce new technology and full automation and mechanization of production. From all corners of the country there is news of remarkable labor achievements. The extremely long Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline has been laid in record time. Train traffic has been opened along the whole length of the longest rail line--the BAM. Workers in the "Tomskneft" production association fulfilled their 11th Five-Year Plan ahead of time. One of the largest enterprises in Moscow, Automobile Plant imeni Lenin Komsomol, is being renovated. With each day our country becomes stronger and more powerful.

Now, when such large-scale, complex and innovative tasks stand before our country, the party calls all workers to the highest requirements which are dictated by life and multiply their forces in the struggle for social and economic development of society. Everywhere there are reserves for greater labor productivity. This comes, first of all, from the best use of what is available for inducing order, increasing responsibility and strengthening discipline. "The historic fate of the country and the position of socialism in the modern world to a great deal depend upon how we conduct business from

now on, " General Secretary of the Party Central Committee Comrade M. S. Gorbachev said in his report to the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "By widely using the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and bringing about forms of socialist economics in conjunction with modern conditions and requirements, we must achieve the essential acceleration in social and economic progress. There is simply no other way."

Calling the Soviet people to work selflessly and with effort, the Party has one goal--to make the life of our people still better. Everything which is done in the country, is done in the interest of the people. Concern for mankind with its shaded materialist and cultural requirements was and remains the main component of the party and state plans.

In order that our plans will be completely realized and the great and fundamental tasks are successfully accomplished, we need peace. The Soviet people must have a calm situation in which to work. For the sake of this we, soldiers, also carry our heavy military service. We have been entrusted with that thing most dear: the protection of peace and the creative work of the Soviet people and the defense of our beloved homeland. This is our concrete portion in the responsible relationship which the Party requires of each person.

We live in complex times and in an intense and dangerous situation. Our party and the Soviet government are making great effort to keep the peace and to save the world from nuclear destruction. However, USSR forces have already blocked the imperialist U.S for many years. Blindly hating socialism and ignoring the convincing lessons of history, the reactionary imperialist forces have not abandoned their hopes to settle the historical controversy between the two social systems by military means. Therefore, while a real threat of attack on the Soviet Union exists, and it does exist at the present time, the CPSU in solving problems of creation, undeviatingly supports the Leninist directive that steps toward peace must be accompanied by the effort of all our military readiness. In this case the CPSU proceeds from the proposition that the most important material basis for maintaining peace on earth is the capability of socialism to protect and maintain strategic military parity.

What is the greatest source of military danger? The striving of U.S. imperialists and their NATO allies to achieve military superiority over us and from this position to dictate their will. The U.S. administration and the military-industrial complex, to which it is completely subordinate and obedient in everything, continues a gigantic program of forced creation of newer and newer types of nuclear missile as well as conventional weapons. The U.S. is taking steps to realize the so-called "Star Wars" program creating space strike weapons. Under the screen of discussions on the so-called defensive characteristics of this program is hidden the evil concept of attempting to paralyze Soviet strategic weapons and provide itself with the capability of striking our country without retaliation. The Soviet Union, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev noted in his speech in Dnepropetrovsk, if presented with a real threat from space, would find methods to effectively counter it.

The threat to the whole world also lies in the lack of desire among the aggressive forces of capitalism to recognize the right of sovereignty and

independence for all peoples. The imperialist beast of prey conducts an openly colonial policy in relation to the newly liberated states and for this uses all its resources--military and economic, threats and bullying, sops and bribery. The imperialists are responsible for the breeding grounds of dangerous tension arising in different parts of the earth.

Our party has not for a day lost sight of the problem of maintaining defensive capability and has spared no effort so that USSR armed forces would have everything necessary to defend our fatherland, allies and friends so that no one could take us by surprise. The duty of the armed forces to the people is to constantly stay in such combat readiness which would guarantee that any aggression would be repelled regardless of where it comes from.

This requirement is not new. It has always been at the fore, but the conditions for accomplishing it are now many times more complicated and the responsibility has become incalculably greater. Modern conditions require the highest degree of vigilance and combat readiness. Aggressive U.S. circles are nurturing plans to make a surprise attack on our country. They will take all possible measures to keep NATO forces in such a condition so that a long time for developing the aggression will not be required. Examples of this are the deployment of first-strike missiles and numerous large-scale military exercises during which huge forces are brought to readiness. This is why each soldier must renew more deeply and responsibly recognize the task for increased vigilance. And the main thing is to act effectively in his job in the interest of increasing combat readiness.

As everywhere in our country, preparations for the congress have evoked fervor and a new flood of forces and energy among armed forces personnel. In units and on board ships there reigns an atmosphere of creative search, dissatisfaction with achievements and aiming at still higher levels. The Party points out the need to create such an atmosphere everywhere. The action of the army and navy is an absolutely clear example of the fortitude, exceptional sacrifice and great responsibility of the soldiers of all specialties in their military labor.

Great skill and fortitude were shown in the exercise "Kavkaz-85" by the soldiers in the tank company commanded by Sr Lt A. Davletskin. In the mountainous semi-arid terrain where operating conditions are especially difficult for the troops, not only physical tempering and military skill are required from the tankers, but also bravery, fearlessness, aggressiveness and resourcefulness which they exhibited in full measure. The overwhelming majority of units in the exercise were also competent and skillful.

The results which have been achieved in the pre-Congress socialist competition by navy personnel are significant. The pride of the fleet is the nuclear ballistic missile submarines in which are embodied the greatest achievements of the responsible industries, science and technology. They are armed with submerged launched ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes in conditions to make long submerged voyages in a short time.

Surface ships have even become completely different. They have been equipped with modern missiles and powerful air defense missiles and artillery. The

sailors skillfully use this powerful combat potential and tirelessly increase vigilance and combat readiness. Among the best is the crew of the missile cruiser "Groznyy" in the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. During the year of the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people of the Great Patriotic War, in expectation of the 27th Congress of the Peoples Communist Party, the sailors achieved new successes in training and service: one out of every two crew members is outstanding in combat and political training and the majority of the sailors are sportsmen and winners of the military sports system badge. During the struggle for the title of Outstanding Ship, the sailors decided that all members of the crew would only be Specialists First and Second Class. And they firmly keep their word.

The initiators of socialist competition in the armed forces gladden the homeland with their good indicators in accomplishing all missions. Thus, the personnel of the Guards Air Defense Missile Putilovsko-Kirov Order of Lenin Air Defense Regiment demonstrated excellent training and the well-coordinated combat crews exceeded the operational standards. Here the number of experts in combat and political training and higher class specialists has been significantly increased. Singled out with pride in the regiment were Gds Captain A. Kovyrin, Gds Warrant Officer V. Konochuk, Gds Private First Class O. Korobchenko and many others.

There are no limits to combat improvements. Time and life itself constantly move everyone to more complex tasks in increasing combat readiness and troop training. They cannot accomplish this by themselves. They need the staunch and self-sacrificing work of each soldier in his field. The new approach is, essentially, connected with a new quality of military labor. The party and the people do everything necessary so that the armed forces will have the most modern weapons and equipment. Our sacred responsibility is to effectively master them, learn to properly use them in combat and make daily improvements in the level of field, air and sea training.

The preparation for the 27th Party Congress lies in the channel of tirelessly increased strengthening of military discipline, organization and order. It is well-known that the significance of this factor in the structure of combat power of armies and navies is always growing with the development of military affairs. In preparing for the Party Congress, each soldier, without question, thinks of how to work and how to conduct himself in the spirit of the time. The limits of personal responsibility for discipline is making its way into the ranks in its observance during the workday, on the training field, in work on equipment, in the barracks and on leave. Strict and precise observance of the rules and regulations of military service and the rendering of honors and respect by the armed defenders of the homeland is required everywhere. In everything that concerns discipline and order, there can be no omissions large or small. A good authority among those serving is Private A. Kedrov who is in one of the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) units. He does not deviate in training or in discipline. To the question, why does he do it, he answers simply: soldierly duty, responsibility to the job, for the honor of the collective and impatience with any kind of junk.

This is proper for a soldier! First of all, his own service gives satisfaction in military labor. The most terrible and harmful thing for a

collective is to limit everyone only to correct conversations about the need to observe discipline and strengthen the regulation relationships. Each of us is a creator of the good moral climate in his collective. Each bears this responsibility. To work in a disciplined manner and to work smarter is the requirement of the Party.

The preparation for the 27th Party Congress opened a new possibility for the ideological tempering of soldiers. One should take special attention to study the pre-Congress party and state documents deeply. The materials of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other party and government documents point out the main path to the development of our country, showing the main direction for accelerating the social and economic development of Soviet society. Bringing this to each serviceman, organizing broad discussion on them in military collectives is one of the main tasks of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol actives and all political agitation activists. It is necessary to continuously explain to the soldiers the party policy which is being developed on the basis of deep understanding and scientific analysis of social development requirements and inquiries of the Soviet people and to assist more in giving meaning to our achievements. This will confirm in the consciousness of the personnel high feelings of patriotism and proletarian internationalism and pride in their homeland, for the successes of communist construction and in the accomplishment of grandiose plans of economic and social development in the country.

Together with this the party teaches us to enthusiastically approach the evaluation of anything that has been done. At this time, as noted in the material from the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the main slogan for each man must be creative labor, a combination of word and deed, initiative and responsibility demanding the most out of ourselves and our comrades. The unquestioning observance of these requirements in units and aboard ships will make possible further increases in vigilance and combat readiness and allow more important results in the pre-Congress socialist competition.

The 27th Party Congress will become an important historical landmark in the life of our party and the Soviet state. It opens new horizons for communist consciousness, better conditions for the Soviet people and strengthened defensive capability. The main thing now is to determine the work for each of us, the soldiers, in this daily, persistent struggle to accomplish pre-Congress obligations and to search for reserves for higher quality solutions of training and combat missions and to further increase discipline and combat readiness.

This article is recommended in preparing political classes on the theme "High Vigilance, Constant Combat Readiness Is the Best Gift to the 27th Congress of the CPSU."

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

GEN SHKADOV REVIEWS BOOK ON MILITARY DUTY

PM131253 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 86 First Edition p 2

[Book review by Hero of the Soviet Union Army General I. Shkadov under the "New Books" rubric: "Sacred Duty"]

[Text] In its main programmatic documents the CPSU views the socialist way of life as a reliable guarantee of Soviet working people's confidence in the future and as a factor which spiritually and morally uplifts them--the creators of new social conditions and the makers of their own destiny. To reveal this invaluable gain of socialism and propagandize it among the masses, many of the country's leading publishers have begun publishing a series of books linked by a single theme--the theme of the socialist way of life: its main features, content, and advantages.

The USSR Defense Ministry Military Publishing House has augmented the small library under that heading with a new book entitled THE SACRED DUTY OF DEFENDING THE FATHERLAND. (Footnote) (SVYASHCHENNY DOLG OTCHIZNU ZASHCHISHCHAT. Military Publishing House, 1985, 176 pp, price R0.60) Its author is Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilii Ivanovich Petrov.

The book's main topic is the heroism, fortitude, and courage displayed by Soviet people in the Civil War and Great Patriotic War and the valor of Soviet servicemen during combat training. It is an account of how today's armed defenders of the fatherland continue the traditions of the front-line heroes by their acts of heroism and reliable defense of our people's creative labor.

The author involves the reader in his discussion of the birth of the Red Army, of its formation and maturation in the grim trials of war, by making extensive use of historical material illustrating the decisive role played by the revolution's leader, V.I. Lenin, and the Communist Party in creating a new type of army--the bulwark of Soviet power. The Civil War and Great Patriotic War confirmed that it is precisely thanks to their high level of awareness that commanders and men displayed unprecedented combat activeness and boldness in fighting the Soviet land's numerous enemies, accomplished feats of valor, steadfastly withstood deprivations, and sacrificed themselves for the sake of victory. They showed indeed that the Army of the liberated proletariat is invincible.

The author stresses that our people's mass heroism in defense of the fatherland is a feature of the Soviet character inculcated by the Soviet way of life. Here, the book says, discipline is of paramount importance. The following example cited by the author is a graphic illustration of this point.

Seaman I. Tsymbal, who distinguished himself in fighting against the German fascist invaders, was being ceremonially presented with a high state award by M.I. Kalinin in the Kremlin.

"Would you please say a few words to the comrades here," Mikhail Ivanovich asked the sailor, shaking his hand, "about how you become a hero."

The question caught Tsymbal unawares. For some moments he was at a loss and turned an even darker shade of red, but then he regained his composure.

"I don't know how you become a hero..."

The hall began to laugh.

"But I do think," Ignat went on, "that discipline is the key. The transition from discipline to heroism is but a single step..."

V.I. Petrov devotes a large space in his book to describing combat training, life and conditions in the modern Army, and the exploits of Soviet internationalist servicemen. Using specific examples drawn from everyday life, the author shows the humanism, moral mobility, ardent patriotism, revolutionary optimism, communist single-mindedness, sense of responsibility, and readiness of our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers to take bold and resolute action in all situations, even the most critical.

It is particularly important, the author writes, for the molding of these qualities in the armed defenders to make skillful use of various forms and methods of party political work and to imbue the personnel with a spirit of lofty ideological conviction and unbounded devotion to the Communist Party and the Soviet people and enmity toward the enemies of socialism.

The strength of martial comradeship--that unshakable tradition of our Army--is vividly and compellingly brought out in the book in the light of the author's personal front-line experience. That comradeship expresses the essence of the Soviet way of life applied to military service and the ethos of the Soviet people nurtured by the Communist Party on the basis of ideas of collectivism, friendship, and mutual aid. For everyone who traveled the arduous roads of war and shared with a trench comrade the last sugar and round of ammunition Suvorov's commandment "Save your comrade before yourself" was the norm of behaviour and a vital rule.

Friendship and readiness to assist a colleague or rescue a comrade from disaster remain to this very day a law of military service. These qualities greatly fortify the servicemen, unite subunits, and help overcome the difficulties and adversities of army life. At the same time martial

friendship and mutual assistance on the battlefield demand not an individual noble impulse but daily and constant self-development and the readiness to give one's all to the very end in order to execute an order, help a comrade, and gain a common victory.

The new book has the merit of reflecting the continuity of generations. The grandfathers-fathers-children theme is evoked by the author in many and varied ways. Brought up in the combat and heroic traditions of the past, today's generation of Soviet youth is rendering the motherland selfless and self-sacrificing service. It is simply impossible to enumerate all of today's heroes--the successors of those prewar and wartime heroes but the book does talk about many of them.

The book pays much attention to showing the beauty of the ethos of the Soviet serviceman, patriot, and internationalist. Disinterested aid to peoples engaged in struggle, respect for their national traditions and customs, and the manifestation of proletarian internationalism are qualities which have deservedly gained Soviet officers and men love and gratitude in many countries of the world. This constitutes the finest assessment of the advantages of the Soviet way of life, the author observes. We are rightly proud of our motherland, the Soviet people, and of belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces--the most powerful, humane, and just army.

The armies guarding the interests of capital live by different laws, the laws of violence and plunder.

Digesting the passages where the author describes the crimes committed by the representatives of imperialist armies, sowing death, violence, and plunder wherever they happen to be and committing monstrous atrocities comparable only with the crimes of the fascists during World War II, you involuntarily feel hatred toward those "warriors."

The book is also noteworthy for the way the author's opinions on various aspects of the topic are organically linked with personal reminiscences and advice to young readers. Young people getting ready to serve in the Armed Forces will have gleaned much that is interesting and new after reading the SACRED DUTY OF DEFENDING THE FATHERLAND.

I should like to particularly note that the author has quite rightly highlighted the importance of the officer cadres' role in training Army and Navy personnel to defend the socialist motherland, instilling servicemen with a love for military affairs, developing high moral, political, and combat qualities in them, and strengthening conscious military discipline. Today's officers are characterized by thorough professional competence and a wide range of political and military-technical knowledge. They are the bearers of the Army's and Navy's combat traditions and the solicitous and exacting mentors of their subordinates. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that Soviet officers have a fine grasp of the art of maintaining the troops' combat morale and creating a fighting spirit. This is based on the close spiritual unity of officers and men and skill in finding a way to the

serviceman's heart and winning his trust. The high moral and combat qualities of Soviet officers, which were a decisive factor in achieving victory, are today being filled with new content.

I do not think that I am mistaken in saying that this book by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Petrov, which is intended for a broad readership, will provide considerable assistance to commanders and political workers in training and educating Army and Navy personnel and to lecturers and military instructors in schools and other educational in the military and patriotic education of young people and the preparation of them for service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

REVIEW: BOOK ON LENIN, DEFENSE OF HOMELAND

PM191503 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 February 1986 first edition carries on page 2 a 1,200-word review by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Colonel A. Pershin, entitled "Bequeathed by Lenin," of the book "LENIN'S TEACHING ON THE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND" written by V. Zubarev and published by the Military Publishing House. Pershin gives an account of the book's description of the background to and development of Lenin's teaching and pays special attention to the author's "efforts to single out and formulate the laws and patterns of the teaching on the defense of the socialist homeland," listing the "most important requirements," which relate to the "heightened ferocity" of imperialist and reactionary resistance, the intensification of imperialist militarism, the relationship between military development and the principles of socialist building, and the increasing leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 85 (signed to press 17 Sep 85) pp 62-67

[Article by Lt Col V. Klimov, Candidate of Psychology, under the rubric "Military Pedagogics and Psychology": "Combat Readiness: The Psychological Aspects" (Footnote 1) (This article is recommended for use in the class on the subject "The Psychology of Combat Readiness" within the system of commander training for officers.)]

[Text] Further enhancement of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in the present, complex international situation is necessitated by numerous interrelated factors. First of all, it is a matter of the increased aggressiveness and the growth of coordinated subversive actions by more reactionary circles of the imperialist states headed by the USA, their increasingly frenzied intensification of the arms race and their attempt to militarize outer space.

In the second place, the further improvement of the army and navy's combat readiness is necessitated by the nature and the specific features of a war which the aggressors could unleash. "The contemporary stage of development of the Armed Forces," Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR Minister of Defense, has stated, "involves major changes in weaponry and the appearance of a number of new types of weapons and equipment, which is having a great effect upon the nature of combat operations and methods of conducting them and requires a higher level of combat readiness."

The high level of combat readiness, the vigilance and the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and armies of the other socialist commonwealth nations are rightly regarded as the guarantee of peace and security on the planet and a factor which effectively restrains militaristic forces. "We shall continue not to spare our efforts," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "to see that the Armed Forces of the USSR have everything necessary for reliably defending our homeland and its allies, and that no one catches us unawares."

Combat readiness is regarded by Soviet military science as the basic indicator of the fighting efficiency of the forces, of their combat training, their political and military vigilance. Combat readiness is the condition which defines

the degree of preparedness of the forces to perform the combat missions assigned to them. It calls for a certain level of provision of the formations, units, ships and subunits with personnel, weapons and military equipment; their possession of necessary stocks of materiel; maintaining the combat equipment in serviceable condition, ready for use; a high level of combat and political training for the troops (forces), particularly field, naval and air training for the personnel; combat coordination of the formations, units and subunits; the necessary training for commanders and staffs; firm discipline and organization on the part of personnel in the troops and naval forces; and the vigilant performance of alert duty.

It can thus be concluded that combat readiness embraces all aspects of the life and work of the army and navy, that it reflects their level of combat and operational training, the coordination of the units and subunits, the ideological-political indoctrination of the personnel, their moral-psychological and physical conditioning. Each of the components of combat readiness and all of them taken together are inseparable from the activity of the personnel, because the crucial role in maintaining it belongs to the individual capable, as V.I. Lenin stated, "of knowledgeably using the latest improvements in military equipment."

Bourgeois military theoreticians treat the role of contemporary and future types of weapons as an absolute and try to demonstrate that the adoption of automatic control systems and electronic computers is moving man into the background, as it were. The development of military affairs totally refutes such assertions, however. Man is not an appendage of the machine in military affairs. On the contrary, the technical equipment only expands his possibilities, leaving man as the instrument of action, as he has always been. This becomes particularly apparent when one analyzes problems of combat readiness and its psychological aspects.

The demands made of the combat readiness of the forces and of the psychological preparedness of the personnel are increasing immeasurably in the contemporary situation as a result of the increased, real danger of the unleashing of a war by the imperialist aggressors. The fightingmen must be prepared to carry out their assigned missions at any time, in any situation. The presence of the necessary, stable psychological attitude toward this in the fightingman and the military collective determines their basic psychological readiness. This aspect of combat readiness is extremely important.

Just what does the fightingman's psychological readiness mean? Where does it fit into the structure of his psyche? How is it reflected in effectiveness of action? How is it shaped?

Let us use the following example. In one experiment, the military psychologists announced to a group of young fightingmen who had recently arrived in the subunit that the "Alert Muster!" signal would soon be given. All of those taking part in the experiment were told in detail what they were to do, where they were to position themselves at the signal, and so forth. The soldiers therefore prepared themselves in advance to deal with a hypothetical situation, and it should have come as no surprise to them.

A study of the fightingmen's personal assessment of their forthcoming action in the hypothetical situation showed that they were confident they would do well. As soon as the agreed-upon signal was given, however, the servicemen began to act in a confused, fidgety manner, and a lack of coordination became apparent. Why did this occur? The young soldiers did not possess the necessary knowledge, functional skills or proper emotional stability. The conclusion follows from this that even when an individual is inwardly prepared for action, but this preparedness is not reinforced with solid skills or practiced behavior in a complex situation, it does not produce the desired results. In order for a fightingman to perform correctly in complex, extreme situations, it is therefore not enough for him to be disciplined and prepared. Good practical and psychological preparation is needed.

Psychological preparedness to perform in a combat situation is the most important attribute of any military specialist. It helps him to successfully perform his functional duties by utilizing his knowledge, experience and skills. Structurally, it includes stable motives to perform with military professionalism based on profound ideological convictions, and a positive attitude toward the military service; abilities, traits of character and features of temperament necessary for military work; certain psychological conditioning for direct combat work; professionally important features in the occurrence of the mental processes (perception, attention, memory, thinking speed and so forth).

Psychological preparedness is a state of mind in the fightingman which permits him to successfully perform the tasks involved in maintaining combat readiness and to perform confidently on the battlefield. It is important to bear in mind, however, that general psychological preparation produces the best results when the individual in a complex situation is capable of rapidly getting himself mentally into the highest state of readiness and concentrating on the main mission. Otherwise, lack of confidence and imprecision are inevitable in his actions. The following is a typical example.

One of the officers, generally well prepared, successfully conducted practice firing drills and hypothetically destroyed the "enemy." Soon after that, however, the same officer came up with incorrect target indications when working with the real targets, as a result of which one of the targets was not "destroyed." How could such a failure have occurred in the combat work of even a psychologically well prepared officer? It turned out that he had not expected the real raid to begin so soon after the practice drill and, satisfied with his previous performance, had relaxed. The aerial targets went into action just at that time, and this flustered him. The officer became nervous, delayed making his decision and had trouble allocating the targets. His overall psychological preparedness to perform in complex situations was not reinforced with solid, instantaneous psychological readiness. This is what caused the breakdown.

Psychological preparedness developed in the process of the daily training, in the service and the difficult circumstances of the combat training, and the state of readiness to take immediate action in actual combat are closely united and interacting. The former is the foundation, as it were. It is more stable, while the state of maximum readiness is more dynamic, fluid and subject to

temporal situation changes. It is a concentration of psychological preparedness for action during specific, most complex moments in the work. Drilled conditioning in the instantaneous activation of the mind has the most important role. And the quality and focus of the entire training and indoctrinational process in the unit or on the ship has the crucial role in this. A state of readiness, systematically developed and modeled in the course of training and indoctrinating the fightingmen, is gradually reinforced and becomes second nature. When we understand this interrelationship, we can correctly set the pedagogical goals for every class in any discipline.

Success in the development of psychological preparedness in the personnel to perform under actual combat conditions and to fulfill the responsible combat training tasks depends upon a number of factors. One of the most important is a profound awareness by the fightingman of the social and political significance of the objectives and the tasks involved in the military work. The Marxist-Leninist training for officers, political training for the shore-based and seagoing warrant officers and political classes for the soldiers and sergeants, petty officers and seamen have a central place with respect to convincing the fightingmen of the need for it and giving them a sense of responsibility for protecting the homeland. As commanders and political workers develop ideological conviction in the fightingmen in the process of their political training, they are laying the foundation for the fightingmen's psychological preparedness. Ideological conviction helps the serviceman to mobilize all of his capabilities for successfully performing the tasks and is a crucial requirement for good fighting spirit, the internal basis of heroism and courage, and an essential part of a state of readiness for determined action.

The possession of a solid body of professional knowledge and skills is another extremely important condition for developing good psychological preparedness and readiness for immediate and successful action in the fightingmen. In his work, "More Attention to Our Red Army!", M.V. Frunze stated that "...even with a good political attitude and a readiness to enter into battle and give our lives, we can find ourselves incapable of winning if we are poorly trained."

This idea has indeed been confirmed by the Great Patriotic War experience and by the performance of personnel in peacetime exercises. If the fightingman is trained almost to the point of automation, as they say, in the use of the combat equipment and weapons, there is a considerably greater probability that he will perform correctly in complex situations and rapidly get himself into the highest state of readiness for immediate action. An understanding of the capabilities of his weapons and equipment and of the methods of employing them in any situation will orient his mind in a certain way toward rapid reaction to various hypothetical situations and toward competent decision-making.

Experience in training the personnel has shown that practical training approaching actual future combat work as closely as possible is essential for the successful performance of complex types of activities in extreme situations. This kind of modeling not only develops a stable chain of skills and abilities in the individual, but also generates a number of important psychological qualities and conditions in him: self-confidence, speed of reaction and

orientation, self-control, constant readiness for action, and so forth. Observations have shown that the more complex the fightingman's activity, the more it requires the rapid mobilization of strengths and abilities, and flexibility of thinking.

A number of units in the Air Defense Forces make effective use of various models of complex air situations for developing psychological preparedness in the specialists, taking into account such factors as the level of professional training of the specialists and the actual conditions under which the combat training operations are conducted. In order to compensate for a shortage of elements, which it is sometimes impossible to create in a training game, the model of a "battle" is saturated with hypothetical, difficult situations and extremely tense work. The rigid time limitations set for assessing the situation, making a decision and taking practical action provide a realistic setting, as it were, for the combat situation, and this motivates the specialists to collect themselves to the maximum and perform with precision.

Exercises, live firing practice, classes and drills conducted in situations approaching actual combat to the maximum possible degree play a large role in preparing the fightingmen to perform in tense situations, in which the elements of psychological readiness are activated most powerfully. The running of tanks through the personnel, advancing behind exploding shells, various complications set up in obstacle zones, powerful and irritating interference created during the drills and classes, the creation of an information shortage and situations leading to partial failures are highly important in their psychological conditioning.

The experience of the outstanding commanders has shown that the best results are to be achieved in the development of psychological readiness in the personnel when it utilizes the broad range of methodological procedures such as unexpected hypothetical situations calling for the individual fightingmen in the subunits to be in a state of complete combat readiness and the creation of conditions under which the squads and teams must operate with reduced manning, using interchangeability. Specially created difficulties (operating in gear providing protection against weapons of mass destruction and situations requiring a certain amount of risk and physical stress) promotes the development of good psychological readiness. In the training and indoctrinational process it is important to consider also the fact that in an actual combat situation the enemy will make active use of the dissemination of false information for demoralizing the personnel. Counterpropaganda workers should therefore give daily attention to matters of moral-psychological preparation.

Unexpected hypothetical situations and complications demanding various alternative actions, the activation of general and special knowledge and mobilization of the thought processes make it possible to develop a preparedness for unexpected developments in the fightingman and force them to seek the optimal solutions. Particular attention must be given to independent decision-making and the trainee's personal monitoring of the correctness of his actions and his preparedness for changes in the situation.

A smoothly organized system has long since been established in the functioning of the forces for preparing the military specialists to perform alert duty,

stand guard, serve on the detail for regimental duties and stand watch. It includes various classes, drills, briefings, information sessions, and so forth. It is important for all of these different kinds of work to be used creatively and produce results. Only this will make it possible to orient personnel on the duty shifts, teams and details to the maximum possible degree to perform the combat missions well, and to mobilize the fightingmen to perform with precision.

So-called warming up is one characteristic of the process of going from psychological preparedness to a state of immediate readiness for action in the fightingman. It ordinarily occurs at the beginning of the work, particularly complex work, and requires considerable effort of the individual and a readjustment of his attention, his hearing and his memory, his total psychological state. The warming-up process differs for each specialist with respect to time required and level of labor productivity and depends greatly upon his specific mental characteristics, his personal qualities and his degree of training. Individual warming-up time can range from 5 to 25 minutes.

The conditions under which alert duty is performed, however, do not allow for a long period of readjustment, and they sometimes change so abruptly as to require practically immediate reaction. With this in mind, when the operators in many radio subunits, for example, take over alert duty, they spend some time working at the screens with those they are replacing. They thus completely warm up, or "get into" the situation, and eliminate erroneous or belated actions due to inadequately rapid mental readjustment.

The fact that personnel gradually become accustomed to alert duty, to their functional duties and to the conditions under which they perform is something which sometimes retards the process of active transition from psychological preparedness to a state of immediate readiness. Considering the difficulties involved in readjusting the mind and possible negative effects from its inertia, it is therefore expedient during preparations for and the standing of alert duty to focus maximum attention on methods of stimulating the mental state of the specialists performing alert duty and maintaining their internal readiness for action. These can be unexpected practice signals, commands, hypothetical situations and drills with a mobilizing effect upon the personnel, as well as the evaluation of their performance in various stages of the alert duty and political-indoctrinational measures: political briefings, individual talks, the publicizing of those who excel, the exchange of know-how, and so forth. The good mental conditions of high spirits, enthusiasm and activeness produced by this gradually merge, as it were, with the state of readiness for immediate combat action and intensify the individual's degree of mobilization and his self-possession.

The commander is the main agent in the development of psychological preparedness in the personnel to perform in complex situations. He is required to do more than understand the methods for developing good moral-psychological qualities in his subordinates and for keeping them at the proper level of readiness for immediate action. This must be reinforced by the officer's personal example. His self-possession, restraint, firm will and efficiency and sometimes, his fearlessness, combined with resourcefulness and military skill constitute the best motivator of his subordinates to be prepared to take decisive action under difficult, sometimes extreme circumstances.

Officer V. Esalov's actions graphically demonstrated the motivating force of the commander's example. When strong winds blew down a radio antenna in one of the duty subunits and this highly essential communication was suddenly disrupted, he was the first to begin setting the antenna up again. All of the signalmen followed the commander's example, despite the enormous force of the wind and the 40° cold. Communication was rapidly restored, and the subunit accomplished its assigned mission.

It was later learned that the fightingmen had repeatedly practiced restoring communication under difficult circumstances. Each one knew his place and what he was to do, and could replace a comrade. It was the officer's personal example of selflessness and his heightened sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of the combat mission, however, which concentrated their psychological preparedness into a state of readiness for immediate action.

How a subordinate behaves at a crucial moment depends in great part upon the commander. The detection and consideration of the fightingmen's individual characteristics and their reaction to difficulties and unexpected developments, their thorough preparation for performing in complex situations, their correct placement, their mobilization for determined action, and so forth, are indispensable conditions for successfully directing the personnel in the performance of combat missions.

Party-political work plays an important role in the development of psychological preparedness and immediate readiness for actual combat operations. Everyone knows the force of the fervent and heartfelt party word. When it is needed, it can mobilize the individual to the maximum degree, activate his psychological resources and relieve excessive tension and constraint hampering the work. Stressing the role of the word, the great Russian physiologist I.P. Pavlov said that in many cases it has enormous advantages over a direct stimulant. Commanders and political workers take this into account in the process of training and indoctrinating the personnel.

The arsenal of the commanders and political workers contains numerous tested forms of party-political work for developing in the personnel good moral and psychological qualities, fighting efficiency and readiness for battle. Lessons, meetings with Great Patriotic War veterans and with those fulfilling their international duty, for example, have gained great popularity. Talks to the fightingmen by veterans give the latter a clear picture of combat operations and produce in them a sense of pride in the heroic and courageous actions of Soviet soldiers. This is particularly valuable for developing psychological preparedness, since every military feat and every front-line episode embodied experience in functioning in complex and dangerous combat situations with abundant unexpected developments. And situations of this kind will undoubtedly be encountered also in a possible nuclear war. This kind of knowledge helps the fightingmen to predict their actions, to develop specific attitudes toward danger and to prepare themselves for unexpected developments.

Thorough consideration of the situation, skillful use of the weapons and combat equipment, flexible and efficient thinking, acute perception, solid skills, constant combat activeness, and so forth--that is, that which helped the veterans to be victorious in the past war--are important elements of success in

modern warfare as well. This is why it is important to vigorously publicize the combat feats. Meetings of the fightingmen with veterans who served in their branch of troops are particularly beneficial. They make it possible to better understand the specific features of the combat work, the fine points of military skill and what kind of actions are possible in such situations. As the fightingman listen to the veteran, he not only recreates the battles in his mind, but also correlates his personal experience to the requirements of modern combat. This motivates him to improve himself, and he prepares himself psychologically for dangerous situations.

The military collective has a large role in the development of psychological readiness in the fightingman. Studies have shown that the collective's evaluation is highly important to an individual. The fightingman receives the collective's acknowledgement of his merits with a fair amount of emotion.

In our opinion, what should the commanders, political workers and party organizations focus their attention on in order to skillfully apply the collective's indoctrinational force with respect to developing a state of constant psychological readiness for successful action in the personnel? It includes the establishment of a wholesome moral climate, a good knowledge of the feelings and relations of the fightingmen, actively influencing those who have abandoned vigilance by means of public opinion, and endeavoring to improve their combat training. It is essential to use the collective's influence for making the fightingmen's motivation to work more significant, for increasing their sense of responsibility for the subunit's prestige, for getting them to evaluate their actions and deeds self-critically and for giving the personnel a greater desire to improve themselves.

A thorough understanding by commanders and political workers of the nature of the problems involved in training and indoctrinating the personnel and their mastery of methods of maintaining psychological readiness for immediate action in the fightingmen are a guarantee that the missions involved in protecting the socialist homeland will be successfully accomplished.

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WARSAW PACT

TRAINING ARMORED FORCES AGAINST PRECISION WEAPONRY

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 86 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Lavrenyuk, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Commander Makes the Decision"]

[Text] The tank battalion commander, Lt Col V. Plyusnin, was returning to the subunit (podrazdeleniye). The vehicle looped over the broken forest roads, but it seemed the commander, deep in thought, did not feel the jolts.

Plyusnin had been a battalion commander for 12 years. He had served in the Far East, Karelia, the Arctic... Looking back mentally, he recalled many exercises: the most common ones, battalion exercises, and the large wide-scale ones in which his subunit had participated. The present situation was more complicated. Tomorrow the battalion had to complete a march from the assembly area and attack the "enemy" from the line of march on open terrain where, as they say, there is nowhere for either equipment or people to take cover. The regiment commander was counting on the fact that his, Plyusnin's, battalion would divert the attention of the "enemy's" main forces, and the other subunits would strike against weakened defended areas.

"Of course, you will be supported by aviation and artillery," Lt Col Plyusnin recalled the words of the regiment commander. "But you need to rely primarily on yourself. Focus primary attention on defending the subunit against precision weaponry strikes..."

The battalion commander understood: the regiment commander did not want to detail the peculiarities of the "enemy's" latest weapon and the techniques and methods of defending against it, meaning that he, Plyusnin, had to think about this himself and demonstrate reasonable initiative and creativity in carrying out the assigned task.

Over the years Lt Col Plyusnin had developed a strict, efficient style of thinking. First of all, he determined what kind of an "enemy" with what kind of armament would be opposing him and with what forces, means, and methods he would wage single combat against him. Then he issued instructions to his subordinates. That is why his instructions were brief, precise, and clear, and almost never evoked additional questions from the officers.

And now, reflecting about how best to plan the battle, he was trying to understand through to the end, which whom and with what he would have to fight tomorrow. He recalled an class which was conducted by the regiment chief of staff within the framework of studying precision weaponry using foreign military press materials which talked about the "Assault Breaker" reconnaissance strike complex. This complex is designed for strikes against tank group targets... He also recalled other weapons based on using missiles and artillery shells with thermal radiation and infrared homing heads. He studied them on his own. His tenacious memory soon drew up a system of possible variants of the "enemy" using these weapons and began to prompt him on ways to defend against homing missiles and shells. "Of course, the senior chief will have opportunities for combating them," the battalion commander reflected. "But, after all, much can also be done in the battalion."

Arriving at the unit lines, the first thing Lt Col Plyusnin did was to call in his technical supply officer Maj M. Guralskiy and surprised him quite a bit with the question:

"Do you know how to light a camp fire?"

He looked at the battalion commander with distrust as if to say: Why do you ask such a question?

Plyusnin explained:

"Tomorrow at dawn you will take a platoon and set up dummy heat targets along the open sectors of the battalion's route of advance. You can use dry branches and twigs and unservicable and written-off motor vehicle tires for this. They burn for a long time and are relatively easy to set on fire."

Before daybreak, a group of soldiers commanded by Maj Guralskiy left the assembly area. Before the battalion departed, the group arranged and, so to speak, "started" the dummy heat targets--set the bonfires. Under cover of camouflage, the battalion deployed and swiftly attacked the "enemy" strong point. The precision weapon "strikes" fell on the dummy targets, just as Plyusnin expected. Such was the conclusion of the umpires.

Later on there was a halt. The tanks took cover in the pine forest undergrowth. Lt Col Plyusnin removed his interphone headset, wiped the sweat from his forehead, and called the officers over the radio set. He told them what was in store for the tankmen in the next phase of the exercise and what had to be done to achieve success again.

12567

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WARSAW PACT

PROBLEMS IN TRAINING DRAFTEES NOTED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by Col P. Saburov, senior officer of the combat training department of the Northern Group of Forces: "Regimental Reference Points"]

[Text] The military camps of the Orsha Guards Tank and 'N' Tank regiments are situated side by side. The paragraphs published below talk about what competition gives the personnel and what unused reserves there are in this important matter.

During a live-fire tactical exercise, the tank battalion commanded by Gds Maj P. Lukashuk was tasked with attacking an "enemy" strong point, seize a favorable line, and support the deployment and commitment of the regiment's main forces. Under the cover of darkness, the battalion and its attached and supporting subunits (podrazdeleniya) advanced in a timely manner to the forward edge, deployed, and joined battle.

Then the unexpected happened. Having been tasked to illuminate the "enemy" with special shells, the artillerymen supporting the battalion, commanded by Gds Maj Yu. Gusach, "hung" them not in the location of the targets, but between them and the attacking forces. The tankmen ended up blinded and fired at random. As a result, many of the targets were not hit.

The picture did not change with the commitment of the battalion's second echelon to battle. Cooperation between subunits of the different branches of troops was poorly organized. The subordinates of Gds Capt S. Yevsyukov as well as their comrades-in-arms did not distinguish themselves with their firing accuracy. As a result, the men from Orsha received only a satisfactory rating for the live-fire tactical exercise.

Shortly after, a live-fire tactical exercise was also held in the 'N' Tank Regiment. Here they already knew the rating of their rivals and also knew the mistakes made at the training ground. The commander and chief of staff visited the Orsha men and analyzed in detail each phase of the battalion exercise. Returning to the regiment, they conducted a scrupulous critique with their subordinates and made necessary adjustments in preparing for the exercise.

The lesson, as they say, was of benefit. The battalion commanded by Maj Yu. Kuklin and other subunits operated efficiently and in concord at the exercise, demonstrated sound tactical gunnery training, and earned a high rating.

This episode from the competition between the two regiments was discussed at a session of the military council of the Northern Group of Forces. Although in this case the point was not advanced experience but how to learn from mistakes, the conversation was helpful. It is no secret that some organizers of competition forget that useful lessons can also be drawn from shortcomings; it is only necessary to approach this thoughtfully and creatively.

But alas, this is not always how it is seen in practice.

In the last training year elements of unimaginativeness and formalism were permitted in both of the competing regiments as far back as in the phase of making commitments. Many of the subunits outlined unreasonable goals for themselves that were clearly beyond their powers, especially for increasing the number of excellent soldiers in combat and political training. The regiments had quite a few of them, and everyone thought there could be even more. However, 6 months later it suddenly turned out that many of the experienced tank commanders, gunners, and excellent soldiers in training who had pledged to become excellent in combat and political training were being transferred to the reserve. The young soldiers replacing them did not achieve excellent results in the remaining 6 months. As a result, the commitments ended up unfulfilled. But, after all, the subunit commanders and other organizers of competition were obliged to foresee this natural replacement of specialists. What is more, they were obliged to draw lessons from last year's mistake. Adopting commitments for the new training year, some of them again did not draw the correct conclusions and again made overstated commitments. Prior to the start of the new training year, the commander, staff, and political department of the formation (soyedineniye) had to step in and help determine realistic goals for each subunit and the regiments.

It is precisely in the staff of the formation and in the political department that the threads of control of the competition come together, and who, if not they, are to be the "band-leaders" of the competing units and subunits, to include working up recommendations for eliminating shortcomings and coordinating all efforts to fulfill the plans. The experience of the past year shows that the staff and political department of the formation were not always the "band-leaders" they were called upon to be.

I remember, at one of the phases of the competition it clearly appeared that the Orsha Regiment was not fulfilling its pledges in matters of personnel fire training. An especially disturbing situation had developed in the tank battalion commanded by Gds Maj Lukashuk. What steps had the formation staff and political department taken? It was recommended that the subunit communist-commanders be heard at a session of the party committee. Gds Maj P. Lukashuk, Gds Capt A. Borisovets, and Gds Lt V. Golub assured them that they would take steps to enhance the quality of combat training and rectify the situation. But these assurances were just so many words. The shortcomings were not eliminated, and from month to month the subunits made no headway. In

the formation staff and the political department the matter did not go beyond the stages of talking and appeals.

However, they had all the opportunities to correct the matter. It was precisely at that time that in the 'N' Tank Regiment competing with the Orsha Regiment that a method of training first-rate gunners originated and received wide dissemination. The motto "Hit the target with every shot!" became the standard for the crews of the vast majority of companies and resulted in considerable savings in ammunition. But in the Orsha Regiment they only knew about it through hearsay.

There are other examples as well. Valuable experience in maintaining and servicing equipment and armament was amassed in the artillery battery commanded by Capt A. Makagon. The use of improved muzzles for firing at night by personnel of the reconnaissance company commanded by Sr Lt V. Parshin became a decisive step forward, one could say, the new word in fire training. But this was not properly incorporated in both of the competing collectives. But the valuable experience was only casually mentioned at a meeting of the front-rank people in the competition, which was considered sufficient.

I would not be mistaken if I said that in each regiment there are right-flank men in competition, and in each one there is experience worthy of attention. But how is one to determine whose experience is better and whose experience deserves to be adopted?

This is a matter not only for and perhaps not so much for regimental staffs as for the staff, political department, and chiefs of branches of troops and services of the division. But the staff and political department sometimes only engage in propagandizing and disseminating experience, and not incorporating it.

One should think that there is a difference between these concepts, and a substantial one at that. It is one thing to conduct a meeting, an honor evening, or a gathering of leaders in the competition, and quite another to engage in organizational work to incorporate advanced methods of instruction and using equipment and weapons.

In this regard, let us go back to the examples of today. Why couldn't the formation staff, say, arm the regiments' subunits that are lagging behind with the gunner training experience of the company commanded by Sr Lt Yu. Lebedinets? He took over from his predecessor a subunit that was lagging behind, and in 2 months brought it up to be among the leading ones. The company consistently shows high results in all disciplines. It would appear that this is experience. Study it, summarize it, and incorporate it everywhere.

No, so far there is only talk about this.

Here is another example. The chief of staff of one of the battalions of the Orsha Regiment, Gds Maj A. Starovoytov, took one of the progressive methods developments of Maj L. Vontsov in the neighboring regiment for incorporating advance experience in his own subunit, and he is incorporating it. Gds Maj V.

Pletmintsev has also adopted this experience. But in other battalions everything is still being done in the old manner.

The guiding and organizing role of the formation staff and political department is still not felt in matters of commander training either. Many officers received low marks in the past training year; examiners noted the low level of officers' independent study and classes for commander training. But the proper conclusions were not drawn. Deficiencies continue to take place. In particular, class attendance and their methodical level still leave much to be desired.

All of us know well that the effectiveness of competition, including competition of regiments, is largely determined by the publicity and comparability of results and graphic representation of the achievements of collectives.

Unfortunately, things are going poorly here as well. On the territory of the military camps we did not see a single slogan calling them to compete with the neighboring regiment, not a single stand reflecting any of the indicators. There was nothing like that in the division staff either. One cannot but recall the words from the new draft of the CPSU Program that, being guided by Leninist principles, it is necessary to improve the organization and increase the effectiveness of competition and overcome formalism and triteness.

12567

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WARSAW PACT

JOINT EXERCISE IN GDR INVOLVES 'RADIOACTIVE LOCALE'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Lt Cols M. Lishniy and N. Panyukov: "They Are Getting Ready for Active Operations."]

[Boxed introduction: From the Exercise Area. As has already been reported in the press, a joint exercise of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the GDR National Peoples Army has started on the territory of the GDR. Troops that have been moved to the exercise area are preparing for active operations.]

[Text] It is particularly busy these days on the superhighways, country roads and dirt trails of the German Democratic Republic. Here and there can be seen columns of combat vehicles, automobiles and engineer and other equipment with identification marks of the Soviet Army and the NNA GDR [National Peoples Army of the German Democratic Republic]. The troops are in forming-up positions.

The march is always a serious examination for subunits. It is a strict and comprehensive check on their combat coordination, level of technical preparation and the physical, moral and psychological seasoning of personnel. The more so in an exercise where units and subunits of friendly armies are operating shoulder to shoulder.

The highly mobile character of modern combat, the increased high speed capabilities of equipment, the effectiveness of reconnaissance means--all of this intensifies the struggle to gain time and to seize and maintain the initiative, and it requires of commanders and staffs an ability to effect a regrouping of forces and means quickly and in a coordinated way and to execute swift and concealed movements both along roads and in areas where there are no roads, and at any time of day and in any kind of weather.

During the course of the march, we had occasion to visit subunits of one of the regiments. It was a joy to see how efficiently the motorized riflemen operated, how confidently they oriented themselves in an unfamiliar locale. Captain V. Simonenko, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, and Senior Lieutenants V. Sidorko and V. Lungu, company commanders, commanded their subunits in the march especially skillfully. Their subordinates efficiently

and correctly accomplished all scenario situations for surmounting areas of destruction and terrain radioactive contamination and for repelling air attacks. And this is natural: special attention is given in the regiment to march preparation. Here every field exercise is used to the maximum for the purpose of improving personnel march training standards and for training officers in the organization of troop movements under their own power and controlling them.

Soldiers of the 'N' motorized rifle regiment of the NNA GDR also demonstrated a high organizational ability in the march. "The advanced experience of our Soviet friends in march preparation played an important role in our success," the commander of the best battalion of this regiment, Senior Lieutenant P. Vezel, emphasized in talks with us. "The day before we were at a battle drill exercise of our combat friends--in a motorized battalion commanded by Captain Simonenko. We learned much that is useful. In particular, we came to the conclusion that the movement of troops to the training facilities must be utilized more actively in analyzing problems connected with march organization. Taking the experience of our Soviet friends into account, we now, even in movements over short distances, assign subordinates tasks associated with the organization of reconnaissance, march security, traffic control..."

During the exercise preparation period, this regiment's best motorized rifle company, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ye. Lappe, appealed to all soldiers to fulfill the combat training tasks under the motto "Our strength lies in friendship and cooperation." This motto was warmly supported both in NNA subunits and in GSFG subunits. Purposeful party-political work, which is conducted in the exercise area continuously, actively promotes its dissemination among the troops and its practical application.

Before going out to the field we had occasion to become participants in a meeting of political workers of units and subunits of the friendly armies. They openly shared their plans and assessed how best to post the most active party and komsomol members in order to have an effective impact on the attitude of the soldiers during the exercise. This was a conversation of interested people rooting for a common cause--strengthening combat collaboration. Party activists are also concerned about this. Majors S. Domanov and V. Shustov, Lieutenant Colonel L. Falkenau, Captain B. Noak, Senior Lieutenant L. Klyaynke and others spoke about the reality of political work and its close ties with the tasks of the exercise.

Now that which was talked about at the time of the meetings is being put into practice. Thanks to the mobilizing role of party activists, the soldiers both in the march and during organization of positions in forming-up areas are operating in a spirit of great competition. With a gradual increase in exercise momentum, the tasks of party-political work also change. If in the course of the march one can say that driver-mechanics were at the center of attention, then now greater and greater emphasis is placed on those on whom will depend the success of combat firings, launches and bombing.

In the tank battalion commanded by Major V. Golovanov, for example, a heated competition flared up among crews, on the initiative of party activists, for the right to be called the Crew imeni Hero of the Soviet Union of Senior Sergeant S. Kalinkovskiy, who is for ever enrolled on the regimental roster. This right will be won by the one who earns the highest marks in all phases of the exercise. For the time being, a tank crew of the company under the command of Captain Gavrichenko leads in the competition. The competition winner flag is being raised in the unit in this company's honor for the sixth month in a row.

Subunits of the motorized rifle regiment of the NNA GDR are competing for the right to be awarded after a summing-up of the exercise with a pennant named after a celebrated hero, the anti-fascist Arthur Ludwig.

And this is the way it is everywhere: great enthusiasm is springing up in the hearts of the people in every unit and in every subunit of the friendly armies, and a mood of exerting maximum effort in the course of the exercise prevails.

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ARMED FORCES

ARMY GEN IVANOVSKIY EXAMINES PROBLEMS OF NEW TRAINING YEAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 85 (signed to press 18 Nov 85) pp 8-16

[Article by Army Gen Ye. Ivanovskiy, Commander in Chief of Ground Forces, Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union, under the rubric "Toward the 27th CPSU Congress": "In the Interest of Good Combat Training for the Troops: We are Discussing the Draft Party Documents" (Footnote 1) (This article is recommended for use in classes conducted within the system of Marxist-Leninist training for officers for studying the subject "The Principle of 'Teaching the Troops That Which is Essential in a War' in the Officer's Training and Indoctrinational Work"); passages enclosed in slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] A new training year has begun in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Fightingmen of the Ground Forces, like all of the army and navy personnel, have entered it in an organized manner. They have worked hard from the first days of the combat training and are persistently acquiring military skill. They received decisions coming out of the October 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions and conclusions contained in the report presented at the plenum by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with profound satisfaction and unanimous approval.

Units and formations of the Ground Forces are actively engaged in preparing for the forthcoming 27th Party Congress and in the extensive discussion, publicizing and explanation of the drafts for the new addition of the CPSU Program, the party Charter with proposed amendments, and the Main Directions of Economic and Social Development for the USSR for the 12th Five-Year Plan and to the Year 2000. The fightingmen see in these extremely important political documents a clear demonstration of the Lenin party's concern for enhancing the nation's economic and defensive strength. They are clearly aware of their enormous responsibility for ensuring the nation's security and are making every effort to steadily enhance the combat readiness of the units and formations.

Improvement of the combat readiness and the fighting efficiency of the troops is an objective necessity. It is dictated by the increased aggressiveness of imperialism and by the increased, real danger of war it has caused. "...So long as there is a danger that aggression, military conflicts and various acts

of provocation will be caused by imperialism," the draft new edition of the CPSU Program states, "we must give unweakened attention to enhancing the defense capability of the USSR and the strengthening of its security. The Armed Forces... must demonstrate great vigilance and always be prepared to put a halt to imperialism's intrigues against the USSR and its allies, and to route any aggressor."

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have done and are continuing to do everything possible to maintain the fighting capability of our Armed Forces and their combat readiness at a high level. The draft of the new edition of the Program emphasizes the following: The CPSU will continue to work undeviatingly to see that the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces consists of a solid alloy of military skill, ideological stability, organization and discipline on the part of the personnel, loyalty to their patriotic and international duty, and a high level of technical equipment.

The units and subunits today are armed with the latest equipment and weapons. The organizational structure of the forces, the methods used for their combat employment and the system for supporting and directing combat operations are being constantly improved. The combat and political training of the personnel takes into account the requirements and recommendations of Soviet military science, which has incorporated the extensive experience acquired by the Armed Forces during their existence. All of this makes it possible to maintain the combat readiness of the units and formations at a high level.

One of the most important, basic principles of Soviet military science is the following: /"teach the troops that which is essential in a war"/. Stressing the importance of this principle, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.I. Sokolov, USSR Minister of Defense, demands that commanders, staff officers, political workers and all of the personnel learn how to work out and actually perform the tasks involved in preparing for and conducting a battle under precisely the conditions which will exist in actual combat.

It has become particularly urgent at the contemporary stage to train the troops on the basis of actual combat requirements. This is necessitated by the fact that a future war, should the imperialists unleash one, will invariably be a decisive confrontation between the two opposite social systems and will involve the most determined political and strategic objectives, which will be predetermine the possible use of all available weapons by the opposing sides. Their use will give a global scale to military operations and will demand that the belligerents make their utmost spiritual and physical effort and that they have great skill and steadfastness and are able to withstand enormous moral and psychological pressures. From the very beginning of such a war, the fightingman will particularly need professional knowledge and skills, emotional and volitional stability, and the subunits, units and formations will have to have a high level of combat coordination. It will be either impossible or at least extremely difficult to organize the additional training or retraining of the troops after combat operations are underway.

The task of preparing the personnel to perform in actual combat is a complex and all-embracing one. It involves the most diverse aspects of the work and training of the troops, and the command and political staff at all levels,

every officer, must take part in it. They must participate with specific organizational work combined with great principle and a high level of demandingness both of themselves and of others. This is one of the main focuses of the reorganization toward which the party is orienting us. This reorganization, the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, consists primarily in enhancing organization and discipline in all areas, and the responsibility of those in charge for the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

With respect to military cadres, this party demand was specifically defined at assemblies of leading military cadres held in the Belorussian Military District. They stressed the special role of commanders and political workers at all levels with respect to maintaining the forces at a high level of combat readiness, and their personal responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrinational process in the units and formations. The ability to teach the personnel that which is essential in a war is no longer just an indicator of the military leader's professional maturity, but also an important criterion of his political awareness and his sense of personal responsibility for the fate of the homeland.

The military cadres are honorably justifying the great trust which the party has demonstrated by charging them with training and indoctrinating armed defenders of the homeland. This is born out also by the results of the past training year. They convincingly demonstrate that the vast majority of officers possess the necessary political, general scientific, military and pedagogical knowledge, that they have mastered the principles of organizing the battle and the operation and methods of using the weapons and equipment at their disposal, and competently employ them in exercises and the field training. They study the needs and requests of the personnel and know how to influence the minds and feelings of the fightingmen, how to inspire them to achieve good results in the training. During the past training year every third serviceman in the Ground Forces achieved the excellent level in the combat and political training. More than 30 percent of the platoons, squads, teams and crews earned the excellent title. Around 60 percent of the fightingmen who must have a rating raised their rating one or two levels. The military collectives which completely fulfilled their socialist commitments for the past training year and earned the title of excellent collectives include those in which Colonels A. Arutyunyan and S. Timoshenko serve, the Guards motorized rifle regiment which initiated socialist competition in the Ground Forces, which is commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Zhuravlev, the subunits commanded by Major M. Derbenev and Captain A. Kalinichenko, and many others. The good success achieved in the collectives is based on a high level of awareness, a heightened sense of responsibility and professional skill in the fightingmen.

Unfortunately, not all of the units and subunits in the Ground Forces achieved such good results for the training year. For example, the motorized rifle regiment which was until recently commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Lanskikh was the initiator of socialist competition in the Siberian Military District during the past training year. When the unit personnel accepted this great responsibility, it was believed that the regimental commander, Major A. Samsonov,

his deputy for political affairs, the staff officers and service chiefs would be able to organize the combat training effectively and thereby create a good foundation for moving forward. This hope did not materialize, however. Lieutenant Colonel Lansikh gave too little attention to improving the methodological and professional knowledge and skills of the officers under him. Classes were conducted in the regiment within the system of officer training, but their effectiveness was extremely poor. Because of all this, the professional skill of certain subunit commanders improved slowly, and their methodological training did not improve. Not a single master of combat skill has been produced in the regiment in recent years.

This and other facts convincingly demonstrate that when we forget the principle of "teaching the troops that which is necessary in a war," it invariably lowers the quality of the combat training and consequently, produces gaps in the preparation of the personnel. This is why purposefulness, persistence and farsightedness should be demonstrated in the implementation of this principle.

What specific possibilities are there for achieving this in the units and formations? Naturally, they differ with respect to the nature, the scale and form of the training and indoctrinational measures for officers at the division and regimental levels and officers in the subunits. They also depend upon the purpose and other specific features of each military collective. In spite of all this, however, the Armed Forces have a common training and indoctrinational process. It serves a common purpose and is carried out in accordance with a common plan, and it is therefore proper and essential to identify the /main directions/ for the application of efforts to incorporate this principle in the officer's training and indoctrinational work.

First of all, it is important to ensure that the training and indoctrination are conducted on a /high ideological-political and scientific level/.

In view of the fact that a Marxist-Leninist world outlook is the foundation of the moral qualities and fighting efficiency of Soviet fightingmen, it is the most important task of commanders and political organs to strengthen the personnel ideologically. The study of Lenin's theoretical legacy, CPSU documents, the Constitution of the USSR and military regulations, and the development in the fightingmen of devotion to the homeland, hatred for its enemies and constant preparedness to come to the homeland's defense play an enormous role.

A consistently class approach in assessing the international situation is developed in the fightingmen on the basis of the thorough study of party documents, and this gives them a clearer understanding of their place in the common struggle for communism. Their ideological conviction is demonstrated in the selfless performance of their military duty, in the accomplishment of the combat training tasks and the observance of military discipline.

By resolutely exposing the aggressive anti-Soviet and antisocial orientation of the policy of the USA and its accomplices, and by explaining the reality of the threat of war facing the world, commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists strive to see that every fightingman clearly understands the fact that the great combat strength and combat readiness of the Armed Forces

restrain a potential aggressor. The personnel's awareness of their personal responsibility for the homeland's security motivates them to thoroughly study military affairs, to perform the combat training tasks well and achieve good results in meeting the combat standards.

Implementation of the principle of "teaching the troops that which is essential in a war" is inconceivable without constantly improving the /moral-psychological preparation of the fightingmen/ for performing the combat missions involved in modern combat and /improving the physical conditioning/ of the personnel. Units and formations of the Ground Forces give unweakened attention to the development of the qualities essential for combat in the soldiers, NCOs, warrant officers and officers. Classes at specially created centers are used for this purpose, and extensive use is made of exercises involving live firing, live grenade throwing, the running of tanks through the personnel, the negotiation of water barriers on the surface and underwater, and a situation is created in the drills and exercises, which demands that the fightingmen operate for long periods of time in protective gear and that they fully activate their spiritual and physical capabilities.

It is impossible to do this without elements of prudent risk, of course. When competent and thinking commanders conduct classes, drills and exercises, however, they organize them in strict accordance with the demands of methodological science and guiding documents, thereby minimizing the risk. Attempts by certain officers to avoid those forms of trainings which involve a certain amount of risk are therefore totally unjustified. The full allocation of live grenades were not used last year in individual units of the Volga and Siberian Military Districts, for example. In the motorized rifle regiment in which Lieutenant Colonel L. Sorokin serves, tanks were rarely rolled through the personnel, and little attention was given to teaching the fightingmen to cross water barriers afloat in the combat equipment. All of this had a negative impact upon the results of the training and the socialist competition.

The psychological conditioning of the personnel cannot be limited to the special classes. It is important to see that it permeates all of the combat training activities of the troops. The dulling of vigilance and inadequate military discipline also have a negative effect upon the development of essential psychological qualities in the fightingmen and upon the entire process of training and indoctrinating the personnel.

The importance of military discipline is even greater in the contemporary situation due to the large-scale reforms occurring in military affairs, the outfitting of the army with modern equipment and weapons, the appearance of new methods of conducting combat operations and the changes occurring in the structure of military life. Today we need discipline taken, in V.I. Lenin's words, to the highest limits. This is due to the fact that modern combat demands maximum coordination of action by all the participants, flawless coordination and discipline on the part of all the military collectives. The damage caused by any infraction of military discipline increases immeasurably in the combat situation.

The enormous experience accumulated by our army on the fields of battle with the homeland's enemies and particularly the Great Patriotic War experience convincingly demonstrate that the troops can only be prepared for combat operations in peacetime /by constantly studying the likely enemy, his weapons and methods of combat operations, his strengths and weaknesses/.

We commanders from the front era recall well V.I. Lenin's words to the effect that it is foolish or even criminal for an army not to train to use all of the types of weapons, all of the means and methods of warfare which the enemy possesses or may acquire. And we tirelessly studied the enemy and his tactics. I recall with gratitude an exercise in which we sweat blood learning how to overcome the enemy's defense and repel his attacks. Situations similar to those which our commanders created in the exercises frequently developed in real combat. And this helped us to come up with the right way to get out of the most difficult situations.

Time is removing us further and further from those difficult war years. The front line experience is not going into retirement, however, because it is an exhaustible source of military wisdom. It should be actively adopted in the praxis of training and indoctrinating the personnel. We need to understand it in accordance with the demands of today, of course, and to take from it that which is of permanent importance. This includes that facet which involves constantly studying the likely enemy.

In the contemporary situation, this means giving the trainees an objective picture of the likely enemy, seeing to it that every officer, warrant officer, NCO and soldier acquires the necessary amount of knowledge about the enemy's methods of conducting combat operations and have a knowledge of the enemy's equipment and weapons.

This is a large field of action for commanders, political organs, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. It is within their capabilities to organize effective technical military propaganda and the study of the likely enemy, his weapons and operating tactics. When conducting Lenin readings, evening and morning discussions of special subjects and other activities it is important to demonstrate the aggressive essence of imperialism and the rapacious focus of his plans, to reveal the true character of the serviceman in the imperialist armies, who is maintained by ruling circles of the capitalist states and defends their interests.

The importance of /tactical training/ for the personnel is particularly important today. Changes in the nature of combat demand the active development and employment of the most effective combat training methods. Tactics are emasculated as the art of conducting combat in some places, however, and the primitive situation which is sometimes created in the exercises does not contribute to the development of creative thinking in the officers or of military cunning.

Combat does not pardon errors. In the exercises and drills the commanders are expected to create a complex and dynamic setting which includes critical situations such as inadequacy of information, increased losses of personnel and

equipment, temporary disruption of command and control, and limited periods of time for accomplishing the missions. By simulating the likely enemy's tactical actions and his technical equipment, they model conditions which make it difficult to carry out the combat training missions and which demand initiative and alacrity of the trainees.

Practice in the organization of combat, the reconnoitering of the enemy and his methods of destruction with fire, combatting high-precision weapons and interaction between the tank and motorized subunits and aircraft, missile troops, artillery and other branches of troops must be a part of exercises.

In short, it is essential, as Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Solkolov, USSR Minister of Defense, has stated, particularly in exercises on various scales, not to train the personnel under easy conditions, but to accomplish the mission with consideration for all of the complexity of the operational situation and to create its elements of uncertainty and contradiction. It is essential to see to it that the trainees are constantly dealing with a powerful, intelligent, cunning and active enemy and that they persistently learn how to conquer such an enemy.

The increased effectiveness of the weapons and the fact that the battlefield is saturated with them, as a result of which the first shot or the first salvo can to a certain degree influence the seizing of the fire initiative and affect the course of the battle and its outcome, are given primary consideration in the /fire training/. Teaching the personnel that which is essential in a war means striving to give the fightingmen a faultless knowledge of the weapons and combat equipment and methods of employing them, and developing in them solid skills for reconnoitering targets, for the practical application of the firing rules and for taking full advantage of the capabilities of the organic weapons for performing the fire missions in the most expedient sequence and destroying targets rapidly, day or night, at maximum range, with the first shot (or launching).

Today, our army's units and subunits have a large number of collectively employed weapons. Concern for training the crews and teams, for giving them coordination and interchangeability and the ability to accomplish the fire missions with reduced personnel is therefore occupying an increasingly important place in the work of commanders at all levels. The experience of our best units and subunits--those in which Lieutenant Colonels G. Andreyev, V. Petrov and V. Krivulkin and Major Yu. Chernyshov serve, for example--has shown that all of these missions can be accomplished well and within limited time periods when a creative approach is taken to the matter, when precisely organized, scheduled classes are reinforced with active participation by the fightingmen in firing groups, in fire training rivalries and in the competition for meeting the combat training standards.

The saturation of the army with complex weapons and the diversity of the equipment make it necessary to improve the /technical training/ of the personnel to the utmost. Knowledge alone, even thorough, all-around knowledge, is not enough to take maximum advantage of the equipment's capabilities. Solid skills in employing the weapons in the complex conditions of modern combat are also

needed. The stress experienced by a fightingman in a combat situation can reduce his ability to perform effectively and analyze the situation. Skills acquired by experience, however, have considerable stability in situations of stress. The handling of the equipment and weapons must therefore be practiced until they become automatic. "A battalion is harmed more than helped by a soldier who must search his mind or rack his brain to understand what an order requires of him," F. Engels wrote. And he wrote this in the middle of the last century about combat operations which were immeasurably more simple than [modern] combat.

Modern combat requires the ability to conduct combat operations simultaneously on the front and in the depth, on the ground and in the air, with the rapid switching of forces from one axis to another. The latter makes it necessary to constantly improve the /march training/. The main attention must be given to organizing the march well, arriving at the designated place in good time and fully prepared for action, and to developing solid skills in operating tanks, self-propelled guns and combat vehicles in unit and formation columns, taking the specific terrain into account, in any weather, day or night. It is important to strive for maximum speed of movement under various road conditions and in the absence of roads, to cross water barriers as rapidly as possible and to be able to restore damaged vehicles. Only by raising the march training of the personnel up to the proper level can we count on victory in highly mobile, dynamic combat.

The further and increasingly more complete /merging of efforts by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations/ is a guarantee that the training and indoctrinational tasks will be successfully accomplished. This makes it possible to extensively and completely cover all aspects of the training and life of the fightingmen--training and indoctrination, the service, social and political activities, leisure time and personal life--in the ideological work. Harmonious and coordinated work by all those in charge in the formation, the unit and subunit and by the party and Komsomol activists provides an important foundation for enhancing the effectiveness of the army youth's communist indoctrination and is a reliable means of developing good political and psychological qualities and moral purity in the fightingmen.

Combat training is our army's main activity in peacetime. The mission in the new training year is one of making it the basis of all the life of the personnel, of seeing to it that every hour of combat training produces real results and is reflected in the improvement of the field and air training of the units and subunits. Strict implementation of the tested principle of "teaching the troops that which is essential in a war" ensures that the Armed Forces are maintained in a constant state of combat readiness to repel any aggression.

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ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL ON IMPORTANCE OF SERGEANTS-MAJOR

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 86 p 1

[Editorial: "The Company Sergeant Major"]

[Text] The sergeant major. It is difficult to overestimate his role in the live of a subunit and in maintaining regulatory order and an atmosphere of friendliness and solidarity in it. The circle of responsibilities that the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces has assigned to the sergeant major is extensive. He is the direct supervisor for the company's sergeants and soldiers and is responsible for insuring that soldiers and sergeants serve properly, for the company's military discipline and the maintenance of internal order, for the safekeeping of company weapons, military and other equipment, ammunition and property.

The general order in the company, the soldiers' moods and their support of all the necessary requirement for selfless military work under very diverse conditions, be it in the cantonment area or in the field, during peace or war, depend to a large degree on the sergeant major, on his political, business and moral qualities and whether he carries out his duties in a qualified manner. An intelligent sergeant major is a reliable support for the officers. There is good reason for the fact that the sergeant major commands the company in their absence.

Subunit sergeants major have always enjoyed honor and respect in our Army and Navy. And today especially units consider them the custodians of our good traditions and the champions of discipline and order, people who make a weighty contribution to getting soldiers accustomed to military service. For example, the name of company sergeant major Senior Warrant Officer D. Kholmin is well known in the Belorussian Military District. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about this man in the article "Company Sergeant Major" that was published 30 November 1985. He has served in the Soviet Armed Forces for approximately thirty five years and has been a company sergeant major for thirty two of those years. He carries out his difficult duties with great responsibility, enthusiasm and selflessness. This is facilitated by his good political and professional training and personal discipline, the high demands he makes on himself and on his subordinates, his personal knowledge of military regulations and his ability to persistently get them put into practice.

Having a sergeant major zealously carry out his duties allows company officers to resolve the tasks of supporting military discipline and at the same time focus more of their attention on the basic issues involved in the military and political training of personnel. And all of this promotes over-all success. Last year the company won the title of "best" for the 35th year in a row and there have been no cases of gross violations of military discipline for many years. Senior Warrant Officer Kholmin's many years of irreproachable service as a company sergeant major and his diligence in his military work have been noted by a USSR Ministry of Defense order.

A sergeant major's success in his difficult job, as, by the way, in every other job, depends on his love of his work, his competence and his ability to devote all his efforts and ability to the business assigned to him. The main thing for a sergeant major is that he be the one to observe order in the company and insure that there is a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collective. He is at the same time the man who is constantly with the soldiers and the one to whom they go with their joys and concerns. An attentive attitude toward people, toward their thoughts and feeling makes demandingness really effective and causes people to have pleasant and long memories about their sergeant major. One cannot count on success without such an approach to business.

In one unit not long ago company sergeant major Senior Sergeant A. Shelkovnikov was removed from his positions because he was being unfair. When his chiefs were present, he demonstrated a laudable zest for his work, but when alone he "might not notice" improper actions by his subordinates. People stopped taking his high demands seriously. And when he made efforts to be obedient, the sergeant major began to distort disciplinary practices. This gave birth to an unhealthy moral atmosphere in the subunit and was in and of itself a gross violation of disciplinary order.

One has to see behind such instances the work costs in selecting sergeant major cadres. And how is this done? An individual shows an executive bent and his chief decides that he may be sergeant major material. And then it turns out after he has been appointed that he has not developed the main ingredient -- the ability to work with people. The Internal Service Regulation has a listing of all a sergeant major's concerns. He must know the company's soldiers and sergeants, their ranks and names, length of service, the positions or specialties they hold, their personal qualities and their family situation. He must know this so that he can take this into account in dealing with his subordinates and in the indoctrinational work which he must conduct.

A sergeant major must always have his people in mind and must look after them. He does this because he is responsible for the appearance of his soldiers and sergeants and he personally adjusts their personal equipment and footwear. He takes care that they wear their military uniforms with dignity when he holds the morning review and when he conducts the evening inspection, when he reviews and sends out a detail assigned from the company and when he gives soldiers and sergeants leave passes so that they can leave the unit area. And the sergeant major directs the company in the mess hall in such a way that every soldier and the company as a whole appear dashing.

A sergeant major can do many things if he carries out the entire gamut of his responsibilities to entirety and with full responsibility. He makes his contribution to increasing the effectiveness of every training day and to the intensity of military labor by providing everything necessary for exercises. By obtaining the weapons, personal equipment and property that is in-coming to the company in a timely manner and, when necessary, sending them in for repairs, he guarantees that the subunit is combat ready. If the sergeant major has set up a well-organized service detail and insures that duty personnel and orderlies execute their duties in a precise manner, the company will not have any disciplinary violations or so-called non-regulatory relationships.

A lot depends on the company sergeant major. And this means that his indirect and direct chiefs, the political workers and staff officers and chiefs of service must focus special attention on this category of serviceman. This starts from the time when sergeant major cadres are selected from among the best trained and most qualified sergeants, warrant officers and Regulars and is manifested in concern for their training and an analysis of their daily activities. An experienced commander holds his sergeant major responsible, but he also supports him constantly. The commander looks after the sergeant major's mode of life and insures that those having the military rank of warrant officer and the Regulars live close to the subunit. The overwhelming majority of sergeants major are communists and Komsomol members. And it is the responsibility of party and Komsomol organizations to get deeply involved in their activities, to get them actively involved in social life and participating in socialist competition, to generalize the experience of the best of them and hold those who show a lack of responsibility strictly accountable.

The increased demands on the work style of military cadres are also bringing new tasks to the numerous detachments of company sergeants major. The main thing that must happen is that each of them must work conscientiously and with maximum efficiency in his position, multiplying his own contribution toward increasing the subunit's and unit's combat readiness.

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EDITORS INITIATE NEW FEATURE ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 86 p 2

[Interview with regimental commander Colonel T. Nabyev, chief of the unit's political affairs section Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Vorobyev and a commander of one of the subunits, Major A. Provotorov conducted by Colonel A. Pimenov: "The Door Is Opening for Everyone"]

[Text] A reader from Tblisi, Reserve Sergeant Z. Kulumbegashvili, prompted us to write this article. His letter to the editor stated, "I left the Army for the Reserves almost two years ago. I remember my unit, our commander Colonel Nabyev and the other officers with very good feelings. The discipline, order, demandingness and justice that our unit had gave me and my service comrades good training for our entire life."

Our correspondent visited this unit and met with soldiers, sergeants, warrant and commissioned officers. We are publishing his conversation with unit commander Colonel T. Nabyev, unit political affairs chief Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Vorobyev and subunit commander Major A. Provorotov.

[Question] Here is my first question for you, Takhir Tashpulatovich. Five years ago, when you assumed your position, this unit was among those lagging behind, but it quickly became one of the best. The unit was recently awarded the Challenge Red Banner for the third year in a row and was entered into the Book of Honor. Could you give us the primary factor that enabled you to succeed in attaining such drastic improvement in the unit.

[T. Nabyev] I am convinced that this factor is regulatory order. As they say, this is an open door. Please come in and act. Whom to go to and what to do is also clear, for it is all written down in the regulations. There is this, and the clear organization of our training process, every serviceman's total accomplishment of his regulatory responsibilities, the daily duty detail's irreproachable service and still many other things that go together to define the entire tenor and strict rhythm of military life. And we use an integrated approach to resolve the task of supporting regulatory order.

I must say that what we succeeded in doing and what we are achieving is a result of collective efforts. As the commander, I am aware of the active, effective assistance I get in all undertakings from the political section, headquarters officers and the party and Komsomol organizations.

[Question] Takhir Tashpulatovich, I doubt that there are officers who underrate regulatory order, but frankly speaking, there are very many who do not succeed in getting such results. What do you feel the reason for that is?

[Yu. Vorobyev] Let me answer that. There is a saying in the East. "Say 'sherbet' as much as you like, but that won't bring a sweet flavor to your mouth." In my opinion, this applies here. You can't just talk about working toward regulatory order. You have to act. And the main thing is being demanding. Being strictly, fairly and constantly demanding without compromising or making allowances in the least.

I'm not saying this to compliment our commander, but he has that quality. As they say, he is equally demanding in everything, from major to minor issue. And our commander imparts this style and attitude into business. Naturally, the political section and the party organization are also involved in this. And I must say that it is not easy to strengthen this style. It requires people to make a definite psychological transformation.

What do I mean? At times many officers, especially those who have joined us recently, do not notice the so-called "small stuff" in observing regulations. But every officer has one requirement: they must not ignore any violation and must have some influence. And not everybody wants to be "bothered" with this. This means that they have to make a break and undergo a psychological transformation. And these are not easy. Indeed, many officers can't get used to noticing the "small stuff" for years.

[A. Provotorov] This is probably the place to tell you that our organization does not divide violations of military discipline into "flagrant" and "minor." The unit commander's requirement is: any deviation from regulations is considered an event and the appropriate measures are taken. It was very difficult for us, the subunit commanders, to get reoriented to this style, but we gradually got used to it. And we see that this approach has a favorable effect on discipline.

[Question] But there are so-called official classifications that cover violations of military discipline, the ones that are used to make up reports and develop statistics.

[T. Nabiyev] Perhaps higher headquarters needs such a classification to analyze the state of affairs, but in my opinion this is not only superfluous, but also harmful in a regiment and even more so in its subunits. I think that one of the reasons for disciplinary violations is hidden primarily in dividing violations into "flagrant" and "minor" and "petty." Isn't this what causes some servicemen to develop the distorted, incorrect idea that some regulatory violations are allowable? We are therefore waging a decisive battle against people who are not being demanding or who are indulging their subordinates.

[Question] How? What forms and methods do you use?

[T. Nabiyev] We have already said that the unit has developed an entire complex of methods to strengthen regulatory order. Which of them are "aimed" at solving this task? I would say that the primary one is the individual work involving one well-known principle that we do with officers: each chief teaches his subordinates. This required painstaking effort and consistency and is unobtrusive, but in return it is the most effective.

We get good results by systematic analyzing the personal examples and disciplinary practices of officers at service meetings.

[Yu. Vorobyev] We also try to do our bit in this matter at the Officers' Comrade's Court of Honor. The main thing in this is not overdo it.

[Question] What do you have to do to get the unit to support regulatory order. They know the regulations, for they are written out in detail in the All-Arms Regulations. But since the results of this work are very different, it seems that the essence of the matter is in the execution, the methods and peculiarities of the approach to resolving typical tasks. Take, for example, the way you have organized your training process. It is set up very clearly and cyclically in your organization. How did you get to this point?

[T. Nabiyev] Let me put it this way. The main thing is monitoring and checking execution. Just as in everything else. We have become convinced that this increases our people's feeling of responsibility and disciplines them.

[Question] But how do you actually do this?

[Yu. Vorobyev] The commander has also established a clear system in this. The essence of the system is as follows. First, we have to be objective when we evaluate the situation. Second, we have to have correct information. And third, every case of a deviation from regulatory order must be carefully analyzed. And we have developed the methodology for doing this. The commander has a set day and time every week to hear service chiefs and subunit commanders report on their past week's results. These reports are very short, three to four minutes, and follow a set format: how exercises went and were there any deviations from the schedule. The next point is discipline. If there were violations, commanders state what they were and exactly who tolerated them. Then there is a brief word on material and domestic support for personnel. They conclude their reports by giving the commander their work plan for the following week.

If officers have any questions or problems, they are immediately resolved since the deputy commanders and service chiefs are at the meeting. Meetings are held in a clear and business-like manner and take about an hour.

[Question] And are there cases where one of the officers tries to embellish his report to appear a little better? For example, an officer may not bring up some deficiencies.

[A. Provotorov] At the initial meetings there were, but in my opinion, there haven't been any such cases for some time now. People have become convinced that this is hopeless, for there regular controls.

[T. Nabiyeu] I would not answer so optimistically. Unfortunately this disease has still not been totally eliminated. There has already been one case during this training year. A subunit commander, Major Dombrovskiy, reported that all exercises had gone according to schedule and that there had not been any disciplinary violations. However an officer from the unit headquarters, Major Shorokhov, corrected him. Privates Ilinykh and Palkin had arrived at daily fatigues parade -- without their detachable collar linings.

[Yu. Vorobyev] At first glance, this is a small thing, but when examined carefully, it gives one food for thought.

[T. Nabiyeu] Yes, the case with the collar linings is very instructive, for it immediately brought to light that several layers of commanders were being careless. Therefore it is certainly worth talking about in more detail. Here is the essence of the case. While checking to see if the twenty-four hour detail was ready, platoon commander Senior Lieutenant Tolstov noticed that two soldiers in the detail had collar linings that were not fresh. He ordered them to change before guard mount, but they didn't have time. Yet the officer who gave the order did not verify that it had been carried out. And that isn't all. Sergeant Somov should have checked to see if his subordinates were ready for guard mount before the officer did. It is not enough that he did not carry out his responsibility. He also did not insure that the soldiers carried out the platoon commander's order.

As is evident, this one fact uncovered an entire chain of responsible people not carrying out their regulatory responsibilities and this is why we did not let this case pass without action. The following day we discussed it in detail with all the officers at a service meeting. And we have such meetings dedicated to analyzing the state of discipline every week.

eYu. Vorobyev] Let me give you some more information so that our system is totally clear. In addition to these two weekly meeting, every month we analyze the course of training and competition with all personnel. We establish each company and platoon position and determine the winners of competition among officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers. But we do not stop here. Monthly results are posted in the club. Before exercises begin the next day we hold a unit formation complete with the band. The order covering the monthly results is read and we hold a general evening inspection that day. And this is the way we do it, month after month. Initially some people did not like these strict regulations, but in time they accepted them and now everyone is satisfied. They understand that everybody needs clear, strict order.

[Question] Some units appoint so-called responsible officers in each subunit to monitor the completion of the daily routine. How do you feel about this?

[T. Nabiyeu] We feel that this measure is a violation of regulatory order. "Responsible officers" are a substitute for someone's will or lack thereof and they assume someone else's regulatory responsibility. But we have reached the point where everyone completely carries out everything that he has been directed to do.

[Question] I noticed that the unit duty officer has a book in which he writes an evaluation of each subunit's daily duty detail. What does that give you?

[T. Nabiyeu] We picked up the idea of evaluating the daily duty detail in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA five year ago. This has been instructive for us and we adopted the idea, but we also improved it. Here is the essence of what we do. The unit duty officer's regulatory responsibility is to check periodically and personally how the daily duty detail is functioning. We have defined this exactly: He is to inspect three or four times per day. And especially during those times when there are no officers in the subunits. The duty officer checks how the duty detail is carrying out the order of the day, if all personnel are present and whether internal order is being maintained. His evaluation is based on the the results of these inspections.

After there is a change-over, he assembles the entire daily duty detail, holds a critique and announces his evaluation. The officer reports all remarks to me when he has been relieved from duty officer. By the way, I also evaluate the duty officers on a daily basis.

[A. Provotorov] We subunit commanders begin our work day by getting acquainted with the duty officer's notes in that book. What were my evaluations? And we have competition among subunits for the best results in service.

[T. Nabiyeu] And on this whole all of this makes it possible to maintain a level of order and discipline that supports the successful completion of our missions. We feel that this year, the year of the 27th Congress, we will be able to achieve even higher results.

[Yu. Vorobyev] I would also like to add that strict regulatory order, discipline and organization have a favorable effect on educating people and under these conditions, the service is a good school of life for them. We get a lot of letters similar to those that are sent to your editor. By the way, Reserve Sergeant Kulumbegashvili also recently wrote a letter to the unit commander. If you will let me, Takhir Tashpulatovich, I will read a few lines from the latter that was addressed to you?

[T. Nabiyeu] Go ahead.

[Yu. Vorobyev] "Dear Comrade Commander. Your former serviceman, Reserve corporal Nikolay Nikolayevich Knysh, is writing you. It has been a year and a half since I left you, but the unit still lives within me and I certainly will never forget it. I will tell you honestly that those were my best years and a beautiful time for me. I have never worked in such an enthralled manner nor

lived so fully. Especially the latter. The limitation on personal freedom for the sake of a high goal, guarding and defending our Motherland, filled my life with such a great feeling that I have difficulty in putting it into words. I accomplished some very serious steps in the Army -- I took the oath, became a first-class specialist and the CPSU accepted me into its ranks. How can one forget these things?

I want to wish you, all my commanders and all the personnel in the subunit where I served happiness, health and successes in the service. I have always considered your course toward strengthening discipline to be correct. I am proud that I had the honor of serving in such a unit. I thank you for such a major school of life. Good-by."

And there is a post-script below. "I now work as an master and am taking correspondent courses at an agricultural institute to become an electrical engineering specialist. I quit smoking on January 1, 1985. Forever."

[Question] I would think that it is very pleasing to get such a letter?

[T. Nabiyeu] Without question. This shows you what a positive influence military service has on people's spirits.

[Question] Apparently it is more than military service that is making an impact on peoples' consciousness. It is also the good, fair attitudes that senior comrades -- the commanders and political officers -- are showing toward them. And I noticed that this fairness is manifested in the demands that officers make on themselves, in the strictness that is equally shown to everyone and in the objectivity and care with which you examine every misdemeanor and every instance of violations of military discipline. In short, our discussion has brought me to this conclusion. Every officer and warrant officer has to work painstakingly and purposefully in order to maintain clear-cut regulatory order.

[T. Nabiyeu] And I would add sergeants as well. Because if one link were to weaken, that is where the downfall will certainly come. I want to again repeat that we see the pledge of our successes in the fact that every person, from soldier to unit commander, totally carries out his regulatory responsibilities.

From the editor. The experience of the military unit which we told you about today again supports the fact that the problem of drastically improving military discipline demands a comprehensive approach. At the same time, the editor feels that the newspaper should present an account of the various trends involved in this multi-faceted job in order to show the foremost experience in more detail and more convincingly.

In beginning a new rubric, we are inviting our readers -- the commanders, political officers, staff officers and party and Komsomol activists -- to relate what practical steps they have taken to strengthen military discipline and to give us

examples of foremost experience which you would like to read
and whose problems and solutions trouble you.

Respected comrades, we await your letters.

12511

CSO: 1801/105

ARMED FORCES

REVIEW: VOLUME ON 'MAIN MILITARY HOSPITAL'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 85 p 2

[Review by Lt Gen of Medical Service Ye. Gembitskiy, Chief Therapist of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, under the rubric "Notes on Books" of "Glavnyy voyennyy gospi-tal" [The Main Military Hospital], Moscow, Military Literature Publishing House, 1985, 240 pages]

[Text] The Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko is the oldest military medical establishment in our nation. Traditions of selfless service to a noble and humane duty, the saving of human life, developed there over the centuries. The hospital's rich past, however--and incidentally, also its present, replete with events--has up to now been given relatively little publicity. I therefore believe that the book "Glavnyy voyennyy gospi-tal," published by the Military Literature Publishing House under the editorship of Major General of Medical Service N. Krylov, will meet with great interest on the part of the reader.

In the foreward to the book, Lieutenant General of Medical Service F. Komarov, Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and Hero of Socialist Labor, writes that "the hospital's history is inseparable from the history of the development of Soviet health care.... The Main Military Clinical Hospital had a definite influence upon the shaping and development of Soviet clinical and military medicine." Numerous documentary materials, studies and photographs comprise the book's foundation. Many of them are published for the first time. The enormous experience of military medical personnel in treatment and scientific work is summarized in the book. The authors do not simply take the reader back into history, but systematically, thoroughly and profoundly describe the most significant events in the hospital's work, events which have influenced the development of medicine in the nation.

When Peter I decided to build a "military hospital" in Moscow, it is doubtful that he could foresee the significant role to be played by the Moscow General Hospital, as it was first called. This was the first state medical establishment in Russia. The first hospital school came into being within its walls, and medical education in the nation had its beginning there. Russian medical science, which used the native language for the first time in history, was conceived and developed there. For a long time the Moscow General Hospital

was the only medical establishment in Moscow. There are numerous facts indicating that the medical work was carried out at a fairly high level during those years. For the first time in medical praxis, hospital doctors developed so-called "sick sheets," or case histories, which subsequently became widespread and furthered the development of medicine in the nation.

The authors of the book tell with documented authenticity not only about the progressive initiatives which enriched science and military medicine, but also about the people who wrote chapters in the annals of the homeland with their selfless labor and daring scientific investigations. Many pages are devoted to the feats of medical personnel in numerous battles fought for the homeland in peacetime, when epidemics suddenly broke out and people were felled by terrible wholesale death.

With extensive factual material the book traces the stages in the shaping and development of military medicine during the post-October period. The hospital had its second birth during that period.

Chapters devoted to the hospital's work during the Great Patriotic War occupy a special place in the book. During the first days of the war a group of doctors were sent into the active army. F. Berezkin was appointed chief surgeon for the front, for example, and A. Nikolayev was appointed its chief therapist. The hospital was renamed the Main Military Hospital of the Red Army in August of 1944. In the words of Colonel General of Medical Service Ye. Smirnov, former chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate, this "legitimized the hospital's status and role as an all-army medical facility, a function it has actually performed since the Great October Socialist Revolution."

Thanks to the precisely organized medical work, the use of the latest achievements for treating the wounded and the selfless labor of the medical personnel, around 84 percent of the patients at the hospital were returned to the ranks.

Undoubtedly, the reader will be highly interested in the chapters which tell about the hospital's work today. A daily struggle for the health of people is being waged there on a broad front, and the latest treatment methods are being adopted. Today, the Main Hospital is a large establishment specializing in many different fields and provided with modern equipment. Scientific and training methods centers have been established there. It is the base for the successful therapy department of the Military Medical School of the Central Institute for the Advanced Training of Doctors, where military doctors from district and garrison hospitals receive special training.

The authors write with special warmth of the people who work within the walls of the ancient hospital. They include numerous highly qualified specialists: Major Generals of Medical Service Ye. Gogin and M. Shelyakhovskiy, Colonel of Medical Service M. Gulyakin, Hero of Socialist Labor, Colonel of Medical Service P. Arzhantsev, holder of the State Prize of the USSR, Colonels of Medical Service B. Konyayev and A. Gavrilov, People's Doctors of the USSR, and many others. They are adding to the hospital's traditions.

ARMED FORCES

RESOLUTION ON CHANGES IN LAW ON SERVICEMEN'S BENEFITS

Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH
SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 1, 1986 pp 10-12

[Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers On Changes to the Decree of the USSR Government on Servicemen's Benefits]

[Text] For the purpose of systematizing the current legislation on servicemen's benefits, the USSR Council of Ministers hereby resolves:

To approve the accompanying changes which are made to the decree of the USSR government on servicemen's benefits.

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov

Administrator of the USSR Council of Ministers M. Smirnyukov

Moscow, The Kremlin, 9 December 1985, No 1213

CHANGES WHICH ARE MADE TO THE DECREE OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT ON SERVICEMEN'S BENEFITS

In the statute on benefits for servicemen, persons subject to military service, individuals retired from military service, and their families, approved by USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 193 dated 17 February 1981 (SP SSSR, 1981, No 11, Art. 64):

a) Add the following paragraph to item 31:

"Career servicemen, warrant officers, and officer personnel are provided travel and accommodation authorizations for rest and relaxation at tourist centers of the Ministry of Defense at the rate of 25 percent of their cost;"

b) Make item 33 read as follows:

"33. Family members of career servicemen, warrant officers, and officer personnel are provided travel and accommodation authorizations for sanatorium and health resort facilities at sanatoriums (sanatorium sections of military hospitals) and rest homes and travel and accommodation authorizations for rest

and relaxation at tourist centers of the Ministry of Defense at the rate of 50 percent of their cost. Authorizations for family members of these service members are provided within limits of the amount of room set aside for this;"

c) Add the following paragraph to item 58:

"One family member of the above-mentioned servicemen enjoys the same benefit when traveling once a year using a travel and accommodation authorization for rest and relaxation to and from tourist centers of the Ministry of Defense issued at the rate of 50 percent of its cost, and also when traveling in the current year (jointly with the service member or separately) to a selected place of rest and relaxation and back, if the service member has not used military travel documents (funds) for travel on regular leave;"

d) Make the last paragraph of item 64 read as follows:

"Property may also be shipped as baggage, but in these instances the indicated norms are cut in half. Property may also be shipped in general purpose containers via rail, water, or motor vehicle, in a 3-ton container for a family of four, and in a 5-ton (two 3-ton) container for a family of four or more."

12567

CSO: 1801/107

CIVIL DEFENSE

PROTECTION OF GRAIN, FOODSTUFFS

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 p 17

[Article by V. Derbin, civil defense engineer for the Vologda Oblast Grain Products Production Administration: "Bread is Life"]

[Text] There is a good saying: "Bread is life." Protecting grain and grain products against radioactive, toxic and bacterial substances is therefore unquestionably one of the most important civil defense tasks.

Today, at a time when drills on the establishment scale have become entrenched in the praxis of preparing small establishments, it is not an entirely simple matter to organize and conduct them. This reflects a poor knowledge of theory by the civil defense chiefs of our enterprises, inadequate experience and poor instructions. The civil defense staff of the Oblast Grain Products Production Association set about resolving these problems. At a meeting of the directors' council, Administration Civil Defense Chief of Staff A. Kiselev explained how drills should be prepared and conducted, and acquainted those present with the necessary instructions.

A demonstration drill was arranged by the civil defense staff at an outstanding enterprise in the association, Grain Base No. 10. During the drill we practiced individual activities. They included, among others, personnel protection, firefighting measures, preliminary personal decontamination, and protection of grain and grain products. We succeeded in achieving the main objective of the drill: to demonstrate graphically and convincingly to all of the supervisors how to apply the theoretical knowledge they had acquired, in praxis, in a situation involving the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction. During preparations for the drill, it became clear that our main task--to protect the grain and grain products--was the most complex and difficult. These are the problems which we faced: how to seal up the grain storage facilities with a small number of people and within a short period of time, how best to perform this work when there were spaces between the walls and the roof, and how to cover the grain and grain products most rapidly--with canvas or with plastic?

When we performed the sealing work, we arrived at the conclusion that it is not effective merely to cover up windows and doors. Two sealing methods were therefore demonstrated. The first consisted in covering windows and doors with polyethylene plastic. The second involved covering the grain and grain products with canvas or plastic.

The first method is not a new one, and it has been used more than once in the collective. But what about sealing off storage facilities with spaces between the walls and the roof? Experience has demonstrated that a considerable part of the time is used and a large number of people are required for covering these. Anyone who has not dealt with this problem cannot know how complex it is.

How can this be avoided? We came up with what we believed to be a solution. We did not try to cover the grain and grain products by dragging the canvas (or plastic) over it, but made a roll of it around a metal or wooden rod. We tied ropes to the ends of the rod, pulled the ropes and unrolled the canvas (or plastic) onto the surface to be covered. Four men performed the operation at each storage unit: two placed planking over the grain to make it easier to move over it, while two unrolled the canvas (or plastic).

The grain products protection team had a special role in the drill. Several storage units were assigned to each member, making it possible for him to precisely monitor the actions of the people and make necessary suggestions at the right time. And when the hypothetical situation, "radioactive contamination" was announced, the team efficiently took samples of the grain, the flour and groats and sent them to the laboratory.

With respect to other, more familiar activities, we tried to complicate the situation with hypothetical problems, or more correctly, to bring it into maximum conformity with a real situation. Before giving the signal "Air Alert," for example, we did not prepare the shelter for the blue- and white-collar workers, but left it just as it had been used in peacetime.

Three people issued gas masks and checked them for serviceability: one issued them, a trainee assembled them--our people had already learned how to do this--and two checked them out for serviceability and briefed the trainees prior to fumigation in a tent. The entire process of issuing and adjusting the gas masks and testing them took us less than 1 hour.

We practiced and then demonstrated how the firefighting unit, the enterprise director and supervisory civil defense personnel are notified in case of a fire during working and nonworking hours and demonstrated the equipment of a firefighting team and how it uses all of the equipment with which a grain receiving enterprise is provided. We had previously demonstrated the procedures individually in demonstration classes. In the establishment-scale drill, however, we demonstrated what to do and how to do it as an integrated process. We completed the drill with a detailed critique.

During a discussion of the drill results with enterprise directors, they expressed a desire that new problems brought out by the need to constantly improve civil defense be introduced into future drills, along with the repetition of activities already practiced.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

GREATER ROLE IN SCIENTIFIC WORK URGED ON MILITARY SCHOOLS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Dec 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Scientific Research Effectiveness"]

[Text] To more fully use the scientific potential of higher schools is a party requirement which was formed in the program documents which will be discussed at the 27th CPSU Congress. The task of military-technical science should be looked at specifically through the prism of these requirements--to decisively convert it to required military practice, to activate scientific research on paths to further improve combat and mobilization readiness of troops and naval forces.

Significant scientific forces are concentrated in the country's higher military institutes--academies and institutions. Among the instructors at higher military institutes, it is possible to find many names whose contributions to science have been noted with USSR Lenin and State awards and who have been given the high title of distinguished person in USSR and union republic science and technology and distinguished inventor and innovator. All of this testifies to an acknowledgement of the services of military scientists in working out fundamental and applied research problems and developing prototypes of combat equipment and weapons.

But one cannot rest on one's laurels. Today science is acquiring a new character. It is becoming a direct, productive force. The leading edge in the struggle for accelerating scientific-technological progress lies directly through it at the present time. The demands of time are to achieve a decisive conversion of science into required production and production into science. This means strengthening all links connecting science, technology and production and creating conditions for the more rapid practical realization of everything that is innovative and progressive. In academic scientific personnel, the party sees an important reserve of intellectual force and potential capabilities which are far from being fully used. This applies equally to the scientists in higher military schools.

Only those higher institution collectives which tirelessly conduct thorough scientific research and together with this work with firmness, principle and purpose toward solving problems of an organizational and technical nature which arise and make it possible to convert the advanced achievements of

science and technology in the shortest amount of time into troop practice can meet the present requirements.

In this context the work of those academies and military academies where scientific research work is being done on an inter-institute basis and where they are constantly bringing into their arsenal the form of scientific institutes working together with army and naval units, with civilian scientific research institutes, industrial enterprises, design bureaus and so forth deserves attention. For example, the joint work on scientific-technical problems using this type of organization at institutions such as the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, the Radio Electronic Air Defense Military Engineering Academy imeni Marshall of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov, Naval Academy imeni Marshall of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko and Military Engineer Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy makes it possible to realize the ideas of military scientists much faster and to give a higher quality base to tactical and technical requirements for new models of weapons and equipment and the methods of using them in combat. It can also be unequivocally stated that the high level of scientific research work in these military academies has a positive impact on the quality of education in them.

Today the conditions exist so that each institute and each department can fully realize its capacity to solve urgent problems in military science. But will this capability always be fully used? At times there is an unwarranted long period of time from the completion stage of a scientific development to the inclusion into practice of new resources and methods of troop control, tactical methods of operation in modern combat, methods of using military equipment and weapons and effective technological processes for their maintenance and repair. But everywhere the urgency and scientific level of research are being strictly evaluated. Institute scientific work plans are often filled with small and short-term subjects. Also impermissible is when new equipment, modern laboratory equipment and computing resources for academies are far from being a primary concern.

As you can see, it is a good idea to create scientific experimental centers for collective use, equip them with the most modern and unique equipment and maintain them in a constant state of modernization. Inventions require serious attention. Among many new technical solutions which each year fill the scientific-technological department of military institutes many promise high returns. Of course, some will require finishing and finalizing, but in the final results the labor and expenditures put into them are rewarded a hundred-fold.

The effectiveness of the scientific activity of teachers and advanced students in military academies to a great degree is determined by the style of work of the institute councils. At a certain stage they are required to be more active and flexible. It is necessary to grasp trends which have arisen in a timely manner and to orient themselves toward tomorrow.

The students and cadets should be more widely included in the scientific work through circles, design bureaus and military science society sections. This will allow the inculcation of a taste for creative work and the acquisition of the habits of conducting independent scientific research and practical use of

theoretical research--qualities which undoubtedly will prove useful to them in their future service.

As is known, good ideas and valuable scientific developments often are born in collectives where an atmosphere of tireless and genuine creative research reigns. The academy leadership, political organs, party organizations and professional instructor staff are required to constantly be concerned about the creation of such an atmosphere. It is necessary to know the time when there is insufficient information to achieve successful progress, to see that which is principally new which may result in perceptible effect and to change ideas in given branches of science and technology. In this case the demands on the leadership are not only the approval of useful undertaking, but also practical assistance. Firmness and party passion and the capacity to overcome the resistance of partisans of existing forms and methods of operation are necessary.

The school year in the country's higher military institutes is in full swing. The military school can in the future solve many complex many-sided problems. One of them is to raise science in institutions to a qualitatively new level and more effectively use the scientific potential on hand.

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CSO: 1801/113

MILITARY HISTORY

RECALLING FRUNZE'S POLICIES IN DEFEATING BASMACHI THREAT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 85 (signed to press 18 Nov 85) pp 32-37

[Article by Col L. Shershnev: "Under a Party Assignment"]

[Text] The newspaper editors have received a letter from Lieutenant V. Grechkin, a platoon commander. He writes that on the eve of the 100th anniversary of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze's birth, our periodicals carried many articles on the life and work of the remarkable military leader of the civil war. Reading these articles, primarily in military publications, made it possible to study better and more thoroughly M.V. Frunze's experience in the most responsible sectors of the battle for Soviet power, to which he was assigned by the party. Lieutenant Grechkin points out, however, that the organization of the routing of the basmachi in Turkestan is a part of Mikhail Vasilyevich's biography which is relatively little known to a large group of servicemen. The author of the letter and other readers have asked us to tell about this extensively and in detail. We are satisfying their requests.

Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze's participation in the struggle with the basmachi in Turkestan occupies a special place in his multifaceted work. This page in the biography of the renowned military leader of the Lenin school is remarkable in that it describes not only his military talent, but also his qualities as a veteran politician and diplomat.

The basmach movement grew rapidly in Turkestan (as all of Central Asia was called at that time) from the beginning of 1918. It covered approximately half of the territory of that area and was concentrated mainly in the Fergana Valley. Describing the political essence of banditry, of which the basmach phenomenon was one of the variations, V.I. Lenin wrote that "this petty bourgeois counterrevolution is unquestionably more dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich and Kolchak put together, because we are dealing with a nation in which the proletariat is a minority..." (Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 43, p 24).

By mid-1918 Soviet Turkestan was cut off from Central Russia by a solid ring of fronts. This seriously complicated the struggle by the republic's peoples against numerous internal and external enemies of Soviet power. It was facing mortal danger.

Considering the military and political situation which had developed in the nation as a whole and in Central Asia in particular, the party and the government implemented a number of emergency measures. The Turkestan Front was formed in August of 1919. It was assigned the mission of completing the defeat of Kolchak's southern grouping and the Orenburg and Ural White Kossacks, preparing and conducting an operation to liberate Turkestan, eliminate the basmachi and lay a solid foundation for the development of political, economic and cultural life in the area when there was peace. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze was appointed commander of the front.

Frunze's appointment was determined primarily by the fact that there, in the East, it was extremely important for the forces to be headed not just by a military leader, but by a veteran politician and diplomat with a good knowledge of the specific features of the region. This was because it was a matter not just of defeating the counterrevolutionary forces militarily, but also one of developing the revolution in Central Asia in general. Mikhail Vasilyevich possessed just these qualities. According to V.I. Lenin, he was "excellently" prepared for the military work and possessed enormous experience in party work. Furthermore, as a native of Central Asia, Frunze had a good knowledge of local conditions, of the life and general existence of peoples in the Turkestan region, knew the Kirghiz and Uzbek languages and had a knowledge of Islam.

In order to accomplish their main mission of liberating the republic, the front forces would have to first defeat Kolchak's 60,000-man grouping, which not only barred the way to Turkestan, but was itself pushing toward that area, rich in grain, cotton and oil. As a result of the successful operation, the so-called "Orenburg cork" was eliminated. Units of the Turkestan Front and forces of the Turkestan Republic came together at Mugodzharskaya Station on 13 September 1919. The blockade had been broken.

The situation improved abruptly when formations and units of the Turkestan Front entered the territory and a large number of military, political and socioeconomic steps were taken to consolidate Soviet power in the republic. It remained extremely tense on the Fergana front, however.

Fergana had been in a state of war since July 1918. It had certainly not become the main arena for the emergence and development of the basmach phenomenon in Turkestan by chance. The Fergana Valley was one of the most highly developed and richest areas in the region, the main cotton growing area. More than a third of Turkestan's industrial enterprises were there, and it had a fairly large element of the national and Russian bourgeoisie, money-lenders and landowners. Finally, the direct proximity of Fergana with emir-ruled Bukhara and with Kashgar (Western China) made it possible for the bands to obtain weapons and ammunition from abroad.

The struggle against the basmachi in Fergana dragged on. During the 2 years in which the Red Army fought the White Guard and interventionists, that counter-revolutionary movement had gained great force. The bands were split up and operated without coordination in the beginning, but they subsequently began to unite into large formations around the more influential leaders such as Madaminbek, Irgash, Kurshimat, Khalkhodzha and others.

The leaders of the basmachi tried to give the bands' operations the appearance of "legality" in order to enlarge their social base. They attempted to establish local counterrevolutionary agencies of power, to distribute and secure zones of influence among the important officials (kurbashi) and to establish a system of taxes to replace the out-and-out robbery, which had evoked open dissatisfaction among the peasants. The basmachi conducted undisguised anti-Soviet propaganda among the population. They presented themselves as "fighters for the faith," "defenders of Islam" and "champions of national rights." In fact, however, the basmachi were totally inimical to the interests of the broad masses of workers and to the progressive and free development of Turkestan's peoples.

The struggle against the basmachi was also complicated by the fact that bands operating in the enormous territory were well familiar with the mountain and desert terrain and knew the locations of villages, mountain paths and passes, and natural shelters in hard-to-reach canyons. They had eyes and ears everywhere. The basmachi were highly mobile and difficult to catch. They would sometimes "melt" into the communities so that an immediate combing and thorough searching of the area produced nothing. There was practically no conventional front or rear in the areas captured by the basmachi. The struggle was conducted wherever the bands showed up. Another specific feature was the fact that the cities had been in the hands of Soviet authorities almost from the first days of the revolution, while the rural area was under the control of counterrevolutionary forces. City was linked to city by the army, which provided escorts for caravans and people.

The basmachi operated most frequently in small mounted groups. They always attacked unexpectedly and disappeared suddenly. Detachments of several thousand men sometimes attacked administrative centers, however. During the raids the bandits would wreck warehouses and stores, destroy stockpiles of cotton and food, drive off livestock, put railroad tracks out of operation, blow up bridges and destroy enterprises, schools and irrigation works. The basmachi dealt cruelly with party and Soviet workers, teachers, activists and residents who sympathized with Soviet power.

The basmach operations paralyzed life in entire areas. Enterprises came to a halt, planted areas were reduced, communications did not operate and people abandoned their homes. All of this retarded or thwarted the Soviet authorities' implementation of social and economic reforms and cultural development.

It was not until the blockade had been broken and reliable communication had been established between Turkestan and Soviet Russia that the real struggle against the basmachi began. It was stepped-up drastically when the Turkestan Commission of the All-Union Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, of which Frunze was a member, arrived in Tashkent.

Various steps were taken to assure the defeat of the basmachi. First of all, order was established in the party and state apparatus and in the forces of the Turkestan Republic.

Following V.I. Lenin's instructions, the Turkestan Commission performed a great deal of work to unite the party organizations and improve the intra-party situation. It helped the republic communists to grasp the harm done to the party by the great-power chauvinists and local bourgeois nationalists. Their purposeful work made it possible to unite all of the separately functioning party committees of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], the Muslim bureaus of the RKP(b) and the committees of foreign communists, thereby ending their organizational fragmentation, reinforcing their unity and ensuring the effectiveness of party supervision of soviet, economic and military development in Turkestan. Members of the local population were added to the party ranks and were drawn upon to take an active part in the work of agencies of authority. It is a noteworthy fact that members of the native people made up 58.3 percent of the membership of Turkestan's five oblast revolutionary committees.

The consolidation of Soviet Turkestan's Armed Forces was another important factor with respect to organizing the defeat of the basmachi and providing reliable protection of the people's revolutionary gains against internal and external enemies. They were virtually created anew under Frunze's leadership. All of the forces operating in Turkestan were combined into regular units and formations. A great deal of work was simultaneously performed to create new forces, including national forces, and strict centralized command and control was established. The republic's military organization was totally subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council of Turkestan.

By implementing Lenin's national policy principles for creating the armed forces, Frunze succeeded in implementing the decision passed by the Extraordinary Congress of Turkestan Councils in March of 1919 that the local population be enlisted into the army. A total of 24,000 members of indigenous nationalities were drafted into the Red Army during the summer of 1920. Soviet authorities truly demonstrated that all of the workers had equal rights and duties. Volunteer people's militia detachments were universally formed to combat the basmachi. Together with the Red Army units, they helped to defeat the bands.

Frunze established a precisely structured system for training command cadres with the specific features of the Turkestan theatre of military operations in mind. These required special organization of the troops, their support and operating tactics. Three-month courses were established and a military department was opened at Turkestan State University in Tashkent for command personnel. Great importance was attached to the training of commanders and political workers from among the indigenous nationalities. There were preparatory courses for candidates for the military educational institutions who did not know the Russian language. At Frunze's instructions, reports and lectures on the political and economic state and the general living conditions of Turkestan's multinational population, on possible tactics and operating methods of their own troops and those of the enemy, and on forms and methods

of performing political work with the population were arranged for the commanders and political workers to prepare them for operations. Mikhail Vasilyevich persistently introduced into the praxis the rule: "First study, comprehend, and then act." He demanded that supervisory military cadres be "thoroughly armed with knowledge, and not just military, but political and economic knowledge, because all of this is interwoven into a single whole, and without a knowledge of these things it is impossible to successfully direct an army." Frunze made mandatory study of one of the local languages a part of the program of the military educational institutions and the officer training. He believed that without this, the Red Army would not be able to perform its responsible and difficult mission--"to plant the great doctrine of communism around itself in the villages (kishlak, aul), settlements and cities and to help establish solid Soviet authority resting on the laboring masses in Turkestan."

The proletarian military leader attached enormous importance to political and indoctrinational work in the forces and to the strengthening of their morale. The orders which he wrote up, ordinarily in his own hand, were not only military, but also political documents. They demonstrated Frunze's profound party-mindedness. He appealed to the class awareness of his subordinates, to their patriotic, revolutionary and international feelings and attitudes, and convinced them of the inadmissibility of violations of military discipline or improper treatment of the local population. His orders united people ideologically, inspired them and motivated them to submit absolutely to authority. Many of them contained an in-depth analysis of the military-political situation in the nation and in the areas of operations, provided a class assessment of events and explained the political significance of accomplishing the assigned missions.

The development in the Red Army's men of a fraternal and respectful attitude toward the local population, toward their religious senses, their customs and traditions was one of the important aspects of political work in the forces. Frunze indicated the importance of gaining the trust and friendship of Turkestan's peoples. He appealed to the personnel in an order to forces of the Fergana Front on intensifying the struggle against the basmachi and on assisting the laboring people: "Comrades, as your commander I demand that you inspire in the population a love for and faith in the Red Army with your actions, with your every deed, both as individual Red Army men and as entire units... demand that you leave behind not tears and sorrow, but joy and gratitude, as you travel through the settlements and villages of Fergana, that you render every possible service and support to the laboring population of the area, without regard to nationality. Only in this way can we make the Muslim poor understand that the Red Army is not their enemy, but their support and protection." This document is imbued with Mikhail Vasilyevich's great concern for strengthening the unity of the army and the people, for embodying the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism in the life of the troops.

Based on the specific nature of the military-political situation, the enemy's methods of operation, the distribution of class forces and the conduct of various strata of the population, Frunze worked out tactics for combatting the

basmachî, which rapidly brought success. They essentially consisted in assigning to the army functions which were absolutely untypical for the traditional armed forces: the Turkestan Front forces were simultaneously carrying out military, political, ideological and economic missions. These tactics were based on the systematic implementation of the national, socioeconomic and military policy of Soviet power, combined with extensive political work among the population and the basmach bands themselves. These tactics were a model not just of the military art of struggle by a proletarian state against irregular formations of counterrevolutionary forces and against banditry, but of the creative application of Lenin's teachings on national relations and on the building of socialism in the formerly backward regions.

Frunze proceeded from the assumption that it would be impossible to put an end to the basmachî with weapons alone, since a considerable number of poor peasants had been drawn into their numbers. "The difficulty is not one of overcoming the enemy militarily. That is not very difficult for us," he stated. "The difficulty is in getting the large, peaceful, laboring Muslim population to understand that the basmachî are their enemies, that it is the sacred task of all the Muslim poor to combat them, that it is the Red Army and not the basmachî which provides protection and support for the laboring people." The main mission was to explain to the population the harm caused by the basmachî, to remove the peasants from under the ideological influence of the landowners and mullahs, to demonstrate with deeds that Soviet power would bring them national and social liberation and protect their basic interests, to stimulate class self-awareness in the rural poor and to rouse them for an active struggle against the bands. A great deal depended upon the correctness of the national policy and the establishment of friendly relations with peoples of the region. In his November 1919 letter, "To the Comrade Communists of Turkestan," Vladimir Ilich Lenin stressed the following: "One can say without exaggeration that it is now of enormous, world-wide historical importance for the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic to establish the right kind of relations with Turkestan's peoples.

"The treatment of the weak and hitherto oppressed peoples by the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic will be of practical importance to all of Asia, to all the world's colonies, to thousands and millions of people" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 304).

Frunze consistently implemented the Lenin national policy in Turkestan. He saw one of the missions of the Red Army as that of making it possible for Turkestan's peoples to develop their own culture, their own civilization, their own economy, to feel the benefit of the new Soviet system. Educational groups were established to work among the Muslim population, and communist propaganda weeks were held.

Frunze believed that in order to strengthen Soviet power and eliminate the basmachî, it was essential to restore Turkestan's war-devastated economy as rapidly as possible. Along with his military work, he therefore took a direct part in the accomplishment of the main national economic tasks involved in developing the region. Mikhail Vasilyevich consistently carried out Lenin's instructions to the effect that the victory of the revolution

and the Red Army must be used to uplift Turkestan's economic life. He worked hard to restore the republic's fuel industry, its ginning enterprises and its irrigation network. All of the fuel recovery enterprises--coal mines, oil fields, haloxylon and timber workings--as well as Turkestan's railroads, were placed onto wartime status.

As the situation on the front improved, it was decided to use all of the units freed from military missions for general economic purposes and to detail special labor detachments from among the troops. The Red Army helped the republic's workers at the very first opportunity. This work was a part of the extensive economic assistance provided Turkestan's workers by the party and the government. Food grants and seed stock were given to the peasants who had been robbed. Steps were taken to develop the land on the poorest farms, and they were exempted from taxes.

The political work performed among the local population and the extensive economic assistance provided the workers undermined the social base of the basmachi, alienated the peasant masses from the banditry and resulted in the exposure of its leaders and of the bourgeois nationalists. The peasants began abandoning the ranks of the basmachi. The population's crossing over to the side of Soviet power was an important factor in the military defeat of the bands.

Political and socioeconomic measures and agitation, as we have already said, was combined with the use of armed means of combatting the basmachi. Consideration was given to the fact that as the peasants left the bands, the composition would become increasingly class-hostile and criminal. Frunze repeatedly traveled to the Fergana Front and visited Kokand, Andizhan, Osh, Namangan and other places in order to get to know the situation better, to study experience in conducting combat operations against the basmachi and to study errors and blunders which were made. He conducted a number of successful operations to destroy bands. Madamin-bek's so-called "Muslim Army," a 10,000-man force, was routed under his command in March of 1920. The "commander" himself realized that the basmachi were doomed and after talking with what remained of his detachments, 3,500 men, surrendered to the Red Army.

Frunze worked out methods of combatting the bands. He countered the tactic of surprise raids by the basmachi with the tactic of encircling and destroying them. The tactic essentially consisted of the following. Powerful garrisons were established in the larger administrative and economic centers. Highly mobile "flying combat detachments" were simultaneously detailed. They were assigned to specific areas and maintained constant communication among the garrisons. When the basmachi attacked, a detachment would interact with the garrison to encircle and destroy them. When information was received on the location of a band, several detachments were immediately sent there from various directions. They were sometimes combined into large formations and combed the mountain regions, capturing operations and food bases of the basmachi, sources of water and mountain passes, and driving the bandits into locations where it was easier to encircle and destroy them. The operations of the detachments, well coordinated with respect to place and time, ordinarily produced success. The tactic of encircling and destroying the basmachi

had a great psychological effect upon them. It gave them a sense of fear, uncertainty and depression, which reduced their effectiveness.

The situation in the Fergana region began to be markedly more stable following the defeat of Madamin-bek and many other bands. The basmach movement flared up with new force there in May of 1920, however.

Operations by Red Army units against the bands in the summer of 1920 were not successful at first. Analyzing the causes of the failures, Frunze concluded that they were caused not so much by the enemy's strength as by intolerable, sometimes criminal, errors made in the execution of the plan and by negligence on the part of certain commanders in organizing the combat operations. After they had beaten or squeezed the basmachi out of a village, these commanders felt that the job was finished. They did not engage in pursuit or conduct simple reconnaissance, but rushed back to the starting point. The bands calmly withdrew and restored their capabilities. There were also cases of traveling without a guard or reconnaissance, in which entire columns encountered the enemy, who opened point-blank fire and caused extensive casualties.

Frunze demanded that such cases be reported to all of the commanders and should they be repeated, that the commanders be relieved of command and brought to trial for a deliberate crime in combat. He believed that the essence of combat operations consisted in achieving big results with a small expenditure of forces. Mikhail Vasilyevich stated that it was pointless to conduct operations against individual enemy groups with the purpose of merely dislodging them. He demanded that the enemy not be just dislodged, but destroyed, and that particularly careful thought be given to the accomplishment of missions involved in cutting off all the enemy's routes of withdrawal.

The operation to defeat Kurshirmat's bands is of interest with respect to tactics. In accordance with the plan which had been worked out, Red Army units occupied the mountain passes into the Kurgan, Uzgen and Alay valleys and set up screens there on a line between Namangan and Margilan to cut off the bandits' route to the Kokand region. The main forces, mainly cavalry, operating on a broad front and executing a number of maneuvers, pinned the enemy down in the mountain passes. Following fierce fighting, the main formations of the basmachi in the Fergana Valley were totally defeated.

The popular masses and the Red Army led by the Lenin party and by remarkable military leaders such as Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, were the crucial forces in the elimination of the basmachi. His experience was applied in the subsequent struggle against the basmachi. Exploitative elements furiously resisted Soviet power, but they proved to be incapable of going against the basic interests of peoples who had set out on the path of building a new life. This is graphically demonstrated by the history of the Central Asian republics, which, under the leadership of the Communist Party and relying upon the fraternal assistance of peoples of the USSR, achieved an unprecedented, economic, political and cultural flowering and set an inspiring example for nations of the East fighting for their national and social liberation. The example of Frunze's work in Turkestan reveals a new and historically unprecedented role

for the army not only as a fighting force, but also as a force participating actively in social development. It also confirms the fact that the art of winning over an enemy consists primarily of a skillful combination and unity of all forms of struggle, with a sociopolitical focus as the determining form.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA VIEWS NEW U.S. CONVENTIONAL ARMS

PM071045 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by V. Kuznetsov under rubric "In the Imperialist States' Staffs and Armies": "The Lead-Horse and the Trace-Horses"]

[Text] A most remarkable caricature appeared in one of the American newspapers. It portrayed a Pentagon militarist chariot hurtling along the edge of a precipice. The lead-horse was a nuclear weapon, and the trace-horses were conventional arms. The artist seems to have captured most accurately both the essence of Washington's adventurist foreign policy course and the trend of the military preparations it is implementing.

The intensive expansion of conventional weapons arsenals has indeed been going on for a long time in the United States in parallel with the stockpiling and improvement of nuclear arms. And the danger of this cannot be overestimated because, according to estimates from the Brookings Institute, over 10 million people were killed by such armaments in wars and military conflicts in the period 1960-1982 alone.

As foreign military specialists note, in recent years the effectiveness of strikes using conventional means of struggle has increased radically. Thus, for example, in area denial munitions [boyepripasy obyemnogo vzryva] the fuel-air mixture set up before the explosion can penetrate unsealed spaces and take on the shape of the location involved. As a result neither topographical accident nor field defensive structures can offer any defense against the effect of the blast wave. In terms of destructive properties area denial munitions currently surpass charges based on conventional explosives three-to fourfold. It is thought in the West that this ratio could be increased to tenfold or more in the future.

Also to be regarded as "conventional" weapons, the foreign press observes, are models of weapons employing the stages of strategic missiles as carriers. One such carrier can deliver up to 20 tons of munitions to a target--enough in total, for example, to put a modern airfield out of action.

So the improvement of jet-engine and rocket technology, the improvement of non-nuclear munitions with high destructive capability, and finally the successes of modern electronics and computer technology have all led to the

emergence of models and types of conventional weapons with such high combat potential that in a number of instances they can substitute for tactical nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that this inflames the passions of "hawks" from Washington.

In addition, the development and deployment of many conventional arms systems, as the press stresses, simultaneously steps up the Pentagon's potential for waging nuclear war. This is because many modern types of arms are fully compatible with the use of both conventional and nuclear munitions. This applies first and foremost to warplanes and to missile and artillery systems. Development of "conventional versions" of weapons also serves to avoid additional political complications. However, Western military specialists believe, a nuclear "refit" can easily be done at a later stage, once there is a sufficient quantity of carriers for such weapons.

The enhancement of the role of conventional weapons was also reflected in another strategic concept adopted by the Pentagon in 1982 and given the name "Airland Battle." It redefined the bases for the use of general-purpose forces units and subunits in combat actions on an operational-tactical scale. The concept is exclusively aggressive in character. It is aimed at suddenly unleashing combat actions jointly with land forces, air force tactical aircraft, and also naval forces on coastal salients, using all types of weapons. The plan is to carry out combat actions to a great operational depth, in order to inflict maximum damage on enemy troops, achieve overwhelming superiority, and wage a decisive offensive to capture enemy territory.

Particular attention is devoted here to high-accuracy conventional weapons. As foreign military specialists point out, the main merit of high-accuracy weapons consists in the fact that not only are they becoming comparable in combat effectiveness with low-yield tactical nuclear weapons but also, because there is no contamination of the area by radiation, they can be employed at short distances from the frontline area without the risk of accidentally striking one's own troops. Moreover, high-accuracy weapons significantly reduce the levels of manpower and resources needed to resolve a given task and do not require adjustments of fire--which increases the surprise element in launching a fire strike.

The latest types of high-accuracy weapons find employment in the reconnaissance-strike complexes currently being set up in the United States. For example, as the INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW reports, in the "Assault Breaker" complex first tried out in 1982 it is planned to use missiles with cluster warheads containing up to 100 self-guided munitions for hitting enemy tanks. The complex is designed for destroying tank groupings at a distance of up to 200 km from the troop-contact line. The "Assault Breaker" complex is expected to enter service in the early nineties.

The gamble on the creation of highly sophisticated, high-accuracy conventional weapon systems, both in the Pentagon's air-land blitzkrieg scenario and in the NATO version, is no accident. Because, as has already been emphasized, the

majority of the weapon systems currently being developed--those reconnaissance-strike complexes, say, or the cruise missiles--will permit either type of filler, conventional or nuclear, to be used.

The accent placed on training U.S. Armed Forces for waging war using conventional strike means has also been intensified in connection with the administration directives aimed at implementing the concept of so-called "horizontal" or "geographical escalation." Essentially this means that, in the event of conventional warfare developing in any theater of war or in a more limited region, the United States together with its allies must be ready to extend military actions using conventional strike means to other theaters or regions where, in their opinion, major success can be achieved over the enemy.

As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written in the past, another fact testifying to heightened Washington attention to conventional warfare is the incorporation into U.S. military doctrine of the fundamentally new tenet of so-called "universal [vseobshchiy] conventional war." Such a war, so the Pentagon strategists believe, will not only be vast in scale but will also entail high maneuverability. In this connection attention is drawn to press reports about the formation within the U.S. Army of light divisions having greater mobility than existing divisions. But it is not only for taking part in "universal conventional war" that the Pentagon is putting the accent on light divisions. Their creation must also be viewed in the light of Washington's notorious strategy of total interference in other states' internal affairs and of military adventures. And it is no accident that the WASHINGTON POST ties in the creation of light divisions in the American Army with events in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Libya, "The 82d Airborne Division and the 101st Air Cavalry are too 'heavy' for rapid reaction," the newspaper observes. As we know, it is the cut-throats from precisely those military commands who drowned Grenada in blood and who are pursuing monstrous, provocative games in Central America and the Near East.

The cutting edge of Washington's military preparations is aimed against the USSR and the other socialist community countries. But, at the same time, the most aggressive circles are resorting with increasing frequency to the "big stick" policy and the open use of military force with respect to countries and peoples which Washington does not like. In cases of this kind the Americans employ conventional arms, and that is one more reason why the U.S. administration attaches such importance to them.

Conventional arms also play a major role when markets for the sale of American military products outside U.S. territory are being expanded. The U.S. position in the world's biggest exporter of conventional arms enables it to strengthen its economic and political positions both in developed capital countries and in "Third World" countries.

It goes without saying that all Washington's attempts to break the military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are found to fail. Nor, in the final analysis, will American imperialism be able to dictate its will to peoples struggling for

their independence and social progress. But the "chariot of death" is still hurtling faster and faster along the edge of the precipice. It has to be stopped. The way to achieve that is set out in the Soviet comprehensive peace program. "In addition to removing mass destruction weapons from states' arsenals," the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, says, "the Soviet Union proposes that conventional weapons and armed forces also be made the object of agreed reductions."

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

JPRS-UMA-86-020
28 March 1986

PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON PLANS FOR U.S. AIRBASE ON MIYAKE

PM061145 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 1 February in its first edition carries on page 5 a 1,300-word Tokyo-dated lined dispatch entitled "Shadow of Jets Over Island," under the "From the Scene of Events" rubric, by own correspondent S. Agafonov. The article is concerned with the alleged concerted campaign by the Japan Defense Agency, the U.S. military command in the Pacific, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to persuade the inhabitants of the poor, fishing-dependent island of Miyake by promises of large spending on infrastructure to accept the siting of a U.S. military airbase there to be used for round-the-clock training by aircraft from the U.S. aircraft carrier "Midway." The article says that the majority of the members of the local authority there are against the airbase and that "85 percent of the local inhabitants have already signed a petition protesting the building of a military aerodrome on Miyake." "The battle for Miyake continues" is how the article concludes.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

U.S. SUB CALLS AT YOKOSUKA--Tokyo, January 24 (TASS)--The U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Indianapolis called at the Japanese port of Yokosuka, now one of the largest U.S. naval bases in the Far East. The submarine belongs to the Los Angeles class. Beginning from June 1984 such submarines are being fitted out with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The visit of the Indianapolis is a third call of a submarine of that class armed with cruise missiles at Yokosuka in slightly more than 3 weeks of the new year. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0658 GMT 24 Jan 86] /9599

CSO: 1812/88

AFGHANISTAN

COMBAT EXPERIENCES OF SOVIET MILITARY SURGEON

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by G. Ustinov, IZVESTIYA staff correspondent, Afghanistan: "Surgeon on the Firing Line"]

[Text] The border guard major from a nearby detachment was businesslike and laconic. An hour before he had received information from a reliable source that the next morning a band of 100-120 men would cross the border from Pakistan with a weapons caravan. In these parts there are four known crossings. Three of them would be covered by the border guards assisted by militia, party activists and local detachments of revolutionary guard but there were no forces for the fourth.

"Could the Soviet comrades help? " The Afghan major asked for the assistance of his, it can be said, already long-time friend Captain Aleksandr Timchenko.

At noon the motorized rifle group consisting of eight APC's and BMP's moved out along the Kandagar Highway through the sandy, virgin land. In the lead APC was Timchenko himself in the commander's seat next to the driver. And next to him in the rotating seat was the gunner. Further back in the vehicle was Sr Lt Sergei Filatov, the combat surgeon, with his gear on the two narrow benches. He had not yet been baptized in combat and so he prepared for the work facing him with special care.

"To locate, much less seize, a caravan is not a simple manner," the captain told the new man. "I've never been able to, but have you seen these Afghans? They have three or four to their credit. The people who make these runs work out a detailed plan for this kind of shipment. There is serious intelligence support. Secret signs made of branches and rocks: 'This road is closed.' or 'Detour to the right.' Signals using smoke and torches from shelters. During a night encounter with patrols, the bandits attempt to break fast and move to the rear as fast as possible and if combat is unavoidable they fight desperately..."

Filatov heard him and from time-to-time looked out of the open hatch to the front, to the sides and often to the rear where in the middle and closest vehicle rode his assistants--the medical NCO's, Ruslan Taran and the brothers

Vasiliy and Aleksandr Strunachev. It was hot, dusty and absolutely uninhabited all around. Far off to the right on the Kandagar Highway there were rare buses and trucks which flashed by and Afghan army road checkpoints: a dug-in tank with three or four figures of soldiers hiding in its shadow.

They went more than 10 hours without any significant incidents. During a short halt Filatov gave an analgesic to Warrant Officer Vladimir Ryadnov who had a toothache. He made a compress for a young soldier who was unaccustomed to the heat baking his head.

Battle fell on their group literally from the sky, fierce and unexpected in the pitch darkness of the southern night. The band, having left the caravan waiting on the mountain slopes directed a hurricane of fire from grenade launchers and machine guns onto the column which had suddenly appeared.

"Hit it," shouted Timchenko to the gunner. "And you, what is going on, surgery? Where is your weapon?"

Filatov had already leaned out of the hatch with his "rattler." He pointed his assault rifle in the direction of the source of the fire.

Timchenko was shooting from the forward hatch. Suddenly he dropped his AKM. Two of his vehicles were hit; the battle became tense and it was necessary to form a 360 degree parameter defense. Tearing the microphone out of the driver's hand: "Take up a 360 degree defense! Increase fire! Wounded on me!" He did not see Filatov.

The first one brought to the command APC was Rishat Abuzayarov, a shy, quiet young man from Kazan. A shaped charge from a grenade launcher penetrated the side of the APC and a stream of hot fragments flew through the cabin. From the other damaged vehicle came Vladimir Ryadnov. "Is there anyone else?" shouted Filatov to the medics scurrying among the vehicles. "Nothing but scratches," answered Ruslan Taran. "They can take care of themselves!" Later the doctor found out that at that time Ruslan had been wounded in the head by a fragment and Vasiliy Strunachev in the leg.

Having seen the wounded boys, Timchenko gave an anxious whistle and gave the order to close the hatches. Fire from one side of the mountain at that time began to slacken: The unit was working well. But what was more dangerous were the individual well-aimed rifle shots. For this reason it was impossible to show light. It would completely reveal their position... They turned on a dim blue light. Filatov examined Abuzayarov whose heart became faint and hands became wet with cold sweat. Puncture wounds, flesh wounds, and blinding wounds--there were many fragment wounds. But there was no fear or grief. His overalls were torn open and tourniquets and bandages quickly applied. Then he began working on Vladimir Ryadnov. "This is the second time I've fallen under your care today, Doctor," he quietly whispered, trying to smile. "There are no broken bones, I know, and the tooth seems to be gone."

The shaped charge stream was "merciful" to the warrant officer directly. There were many fragment wounds, but all of them flesh wounds. While rebandaging, Filatov heard Timchenko calling for a helicopter on the radio.

...Ryadnov lay quietly and the young doctor did not leave the neighboring bench. In many places Rishat's bandages became dangerously warm and soaked. Plus he felt bad. When would the helicopter arrive?

Fire from the mountains stopped. The Dushmans were beaten back or thought it best to withdraw. Even the APC's became quiet. But the silence didn't last long. Suddenly, the night sky again thundered and was lit with flashes. Timchenko, having inspected the battlefield, stuck his head into the open hatch and anxiously said: "It's a thunderstorm!"

At any other time they would have been happy for such a rare event as a thunderstorm downpour in this desert place and with a kind of pleasureable and childlike gaiety they would wash off the streams of perspiration and itching dust, soot and the excitement of recent combat. But the thunderstorm meant it was impossible for helicopters to land and a dangerous, maybe even tragic delay in helping the wounded. In fact, on the radio a faraway voice broken by static had crackled: "I cannot land. There is a broad thunderstorm front. I'm returning to base. Wait for the '24'." The Mi-24 is a highly maneuverable and technically improved aircraft. Its pilots can do magic. But when would it be here. Timchenko again sat at the mike and Filatov decisively ordered to turn on the bright light. With gentle, caring movements he removed the bandages which had become soaked with blood, then powdered and cauterized the wounds, made new tourniquets and bandages and gave him an antishock injection.

Helicopters droned in the air. Great guys! Having heard about the thunderstorm, they got into the air. "Can you take him?" Timchenko asked Filatov seriously.--"And how about you?"--"We don't have anything to fear. I still have three doctors..." In the helicopter Filatov did not let go of Rishat's warm hand; he checked his blood pressure and did not allow it to drop below the required level. He encouraged Ryadnov with a few glances and phrases: "Well, Warrant Officer, is that tooth really better?" The other helicopters flew the less seriously wounded. They landed directly in front of the hospital and in 2 minutes Abuzayarov and Ryadnov were on the operating table.

It was in this hospital that I became acquainted with Sergei Filatov, the 30 year old military doctor who graduated from the Kuybyshev Medical Institute. For that, his first combat, he was awarded the medal "For Bravery" and recently he was presented with an order. Time has passed since the events which have been described here. "How did they finally turn out?" I asked Sergei. "The caravan was delayed and rendered harmless. Many participants in the engagement with the bandits received combat awards including all three of my medics. Warrant Officer Ryadnov is still in the service.

But Rishat Abuzayarov recently wrote from Kazan that he was alive and well to the joy of his family and, of course, it seems to us, the doctor who saved him.

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